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67 
THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
GLOBAL WARMING REGULATION TO 
PROMOTE NEEDED RENEWABLE ENERGY 
Steven Ferrey* 
Abstract: Renewable power generation technologies exist today and 
comprise the foundation for the bridge to a sustainable international 
power generation infrastructure. However, the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto) has 
failed to utilize these technologies. Kyoto also missed the forest for the 
trees: it disallowed forest preservation to count in its carbon currency. It 
also missed including the correct chemical base in developing countries. 
This Article examines what led international law not to focus on devel-
opment in renewable power alternatives where they are most required in 
the international order: developing nations. It analyzes the critical role of 
international multilateral organizations to create the new architecture of 
carbon control before it is too late. This Article concludes by highlighting 
a little-noticed template for renewable power and carbon mitigation 
success that has been demonstrated in several developing countries. It 
highlights the changes to Kyoto and international law that are necessary to 
construct a bridge to the development of sustainable power generation 
infrastructure. 
   Some say the world will end in fire, 
   Some say in ice . . . . 
   And [either] would suffice. 
—Robert Frost1 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010, Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. Professor 
Ferrey has been Visiting Professor at Boston University School of Law and Harvard Law 
School. Professor Ferrey has served for the past fifteen years as the primary legal advisor to 
the World Bank and the U.N. on their carbon control and renewable energy projects in 
developing nations. He is the author of six books and more than seventy-five articles on the 
energy-environmental legal and policy interface. These books include The Law Independent 
Power (Thomson/West Pub., 2009) and Renewable Power in Developing Countries: Winning the 
War on Global Warming (Pennwell Pub., 2006). His articles on energy policy during the past 
five years have appeared in law reviews at Harvard, Duke, William & Mary, the University of 
Virginia, Boston College, the University of California Berkeley, and N.Y.U. 
1 Robert Frost, Fire and Ice, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 220 (Edward C. Lathem 
ed., 1969). 
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Introduction: Why the Renewable Energy Connection Matters 
in the Vernacular of Developing Nations 
 The world can perish with either fire or ice. The world is growing 
warmer from our universal use of fire to manipulate the universe.2 In 
turn, this use of fire is causing the loss of massive quantities of the 
Earth’s cryosphere, including polar ice,3 which contains over 80% of 
the fresh water in the world.4 
 To slow global warming, there must be a fundamental shift of the 
technological base for power-generation from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy resources. The Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto), the multinational 
agreement on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, is fundamentally un-
suited to shift the balance of GHG emission in the energy sector; there-
fore it is inadequate to reduce global GHG emissions to sustainable lev-
els. The urgency is increasingly apparent: the Fourth Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 
2007, concluded that the evidence of human-made global warming is 
“unequivocal.”5 However, the nations that will soon make up the major-
ity of the world’s carbon-emitting countries are not covered parties to, 
or otherwise bound by, Kyoto. 
 There are at least two major international law problems. The first 
problem is that Kyoto is not shifting the world’s energy base to renew-
able power in lieu of fossil-fuel-fired power resources. This is true in 
both developed countries that are subject to regulation under Kyoto 
and in the many developing countries that are not covered by Kyoto. 
 The second problem is that the Kyoto Protocol contains a legal 
void and does not speak the carbon language of the 80% of the world’s 
nations, which may be characterized as developing countries. Kyoto 
does not contain provisions that provide carbon credits or offsets for 
preserving existing forests that absorb carbon in these developing 
countries.6 Developing countries harbor many of the largest forest 
tracts in the world that, if preserved, could absorb and convert CO2 to 
various sugars and oxygen during photosynthesis, thereby reducing at-
                                                                                                                      
2 Working Groups I, II, & III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30, 37 (Rajenda K. Pachauri 
et al., eds. 2007) [hereinafter Synthesis Report]. 
3 Id. at 30; Working Group I of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Sci-
ence Basis 341 (Susan Solomon et al., eds. 2007) [hereinafter The Physical Science Basis]. 
4 Physical Science Basis, supra note 3, at 341. 
5 Synthesis Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
6 See infra Part III.A. 
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mospheric CO2 concentrations.7 Kyoto also misses other opportunities 
to mitigate the emission of black carbon. Even though black carbon is 
one of the most significant GHG chemicals emitted in developing na-
tions,8 efforts to mitigate its emission are not eligible for any carbon 
credit under Kyoto. These oversights put blinders on international le-
gal mechanisms and bias Kyoto’s short- and long-term effectiveness. 
 This Article examines these legal and policy shortcomings of in-
ternational law on global warming. Part I sets forth the chemistry and 
basic international policy regarding global warming, while the interna-
tional regulatory structure of the Kyoto Protocol is analyzed in Part II.9 
Part III analyzes the regulatory omission of the critical role of forest 
preservation and the definitional omissions of international carbon 
policy for developing countries.10 Part IV examines the evolving role of 
international multinational organizations.11 Part V profiles the success-
ful implementation of renewable-energy-generation infrastructure in 
developing countries that provides a critically important model that can 
be implement in other developing countries.12 Developing countries in 
Asia have demonstrated experience on how to motivate the successful 
installation of a renewable energy base in lieu of a power-generation 
infrastructure that relies on more fossil fuel exploitation.13 The Kyoto 
Protocol has ignored these successful models; therefore, it requires fu-
ture reforms. 
I. Time and Carbon Value: The Universal Reality 
A. Proverbial Reality 
 The proverb states that time is money. Nowhere is it truer than 
with international efforts to abate carbon concentrations in the atmos-
phere. More than a decade has transpired in the effort to control car-
bon emissions. In 1990, the world emitted about 40 billion tons of car-
bon dioxide equivalence (CO2e), while today it has increased by about 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry, http:// 
www.epa.gov/sequestration/faq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
8 See infra Part. III.B. 
9 See infra Parts I–II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See infra Part V. 
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40% to 55 billion tons annually.14 There is no sign that world carbon 
emissions are decreasing. Global carbon concentrations in the atmos-
phere are now accelerating at nearly four times the rate that they did 
during the 1990s.15 
 The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts that a worldwide carbon 
increase of 54% over 1990 levels could occur by 2015.16 The Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA) forecasts a 50% world-wide increase of 
carbon emissions between 2005 and 2030 as the most likely reference 
scenario.17 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
forecasts a 25–90% increase over the same period.18 The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) concluded that absent a major policy change, CO2 
emissions could increase 130% by 2050.19 Most of the predicted in-
creases will occur in developing countries, whose emissions are pro-
jected to grow five times as fast as those from industrialized countries 
over the next twenty-five years.20 By 2030, developing countries are fore-
casted to exceed CO2 emissions from developed countries by 72%.21 
 A major driver of the forecasted growth in CO2 emissions is the 
expansion of the electric power generation infrastructure in develop-
ing countries. From any perspective, there is a fast growing problem, 
and the degree to which developing countries plan to rely on coal re-
sources to expand power generation lies at the center of it. Between 
1970 and 2004, total global emissions of GHGs regulated by Kyoto in-
creased by 70%.22 The combustion of fossil fuels accounted for 70% of 
GHG emissions and electric power generation accounted for 40% of 
these CO2 emissions.23 In 2003, coal-fired electric power generation 
                                                                                                                      
14 Tony Blair, The Climate Group, Breaking the Climate Deadlock: A Global 
Deal for Our Low-Carbon Future 9 (2008). 
15 Dean Scott, Global Carbon Concentrations Accelerating at Almost Four Times Growth Rate of 
1990s, 39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1967 (Oct. 3, 2008). 
16 Arnold W. Reitze, Global Warming, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,253, 10,266 
(2001). 
17 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE/EIA-0484, International En-
ergy Outlook 2008, at 98(2008) [hereinafter Energy Outlook 2008]. 
18 Working Group III of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate 
Change 97 (Bert Metz et al., eds. 2007) [hereinafter Mitigation of Climate Change]. 
19 Int’l Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives: In support of the G8 
Action Plan 1 (2008), available at http://www.iea.org/techno/etp/ETP_2008_Exec_Sum_ 
English.pdf. 
20 Energy Outlook 2008, supra note 17, at 89. 
21 Id. 
22 Mitigation of Climate Change, supra note 18, at 97 n.1. 
23 See Joëlle de Sépibus, The Liberalisation of the Power Industry in the European Union and Its 
Impact on Climate Change 2, 3 (The Nat’l Ctrs. of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 
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accounted for about 70% of the CO2 emissions from that sector.24 
Global energy-related emissions are expected to increase by 57% from 
2005 to 2030.25 
 According to a 2007 report from the United Nations Environment 
Programme, forecasters do not see the international mix of power gen-
eration sources changing appreciably over the next several decades.26 
Without a substantial change to renewable or other low-carbon tech-
nologies, the percentage of fossil fuels used in power generation—and 
thus the potential sources of additional GHGs emanating from the 
power sector—are forecast to remain relatively constant. The IEA fore-
casts that by 2030, world demand for energy will grow by 60% and fossil 
fuel sources will supply 85% of the increased demand and 82% of the 
total energy demand;27 non-carbon renewable energy sources will sup-
ply only 6% of the global energy demand, with the largest increase in 
renewable power generation taking place in Europe because of gov-
ernmental investments.28 
 A recent assessment concludes that in order to avoid catastrophic 
effects of global warming, we need to limit the increase in Earth “sur-
face temperature to no more than 2[°C]–2.5[°C]” above the 15°C 
Earth temperature present during the decades preceding the American 
Revolution.29 This will require a sharp reduction of GHG emissions “by 
2050 and to near zero by 2100.”30 This will only be possible if we can 
demonstrate that a modern society can function without relying on 
CO2-emitting technologies.31 
 Moreover, since the pace of reform has been slow, the atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs may already be too high and it may already be 
too late for abatement actions to mitigate the effects of global warming. 
                                                                                                                      
2008/10, 2008), available at http://www.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP6/ 
de_Sepibus_EU_libCC_final.pdf. 
24 Id. at 4. 
25 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-151, International Climate Change 
Programs: Lessons Learned from the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 48 (2008) [hereinafter Les-
sons Learned]. 
26 The Physical Science Basis, supra note 3, at 17. 
27 Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, at 57 (2004). 
28 Id. at 225. 
29 Michael A. MacCracken & F. Moore, Achieving Agreement and Climate Protection by Mitiga-
tion of Short-and-Long-Lived Greenhouse Gasses, 6 IOP Conference Series: Earth & Envtl. Sci. 
282,006 (2009), available at http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1755-1315/6/28/282006/ees9_ 
6_282006.pdf?request-id=77ab72a7-c8f6-467c-a203-353ead5e056f. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
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Climatologist and NASA scientist, James Hansen, notes that by merely 
waiting eight years until 2018 to stop the “growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions,” we would have nearly no chance of avoiding the catastro-
phic effects of warming.32 Hansen forecasts global warming to exceed 
the tipping point once the atmosphere concentration of GHGs exceeds 
400–425 parts per million (ppm).33 According to Hansen, there is no 
ice left on the planet when GHG concentrations reach 450 ppm.34 
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, CO2 has increased 
about a third to 382 ppm.35 A top official with the IPCC has indicated 
that developed nations will need to slash CO2 emissions by 80–95% by 
2050 to hold GHGs to less than 450 ppm in the atmosphere.36 Dr. John 
Holdren—advisor to President Barack Obama for Science and Tech-
nology, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, and Co-Chair of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology—calculates that if U.S. greenhouse emissions even 
somehow plateau as early as 2015, we will have reduced our chances to 
avoid climate catastrophes by only 50%.37 Time is of the essence; time is 
money. The world is seizing neither. 
B. Addressing Fossil Fuel Emissions 
 The scientific consensus is that there is a global warming prob-
lem.38 Carbon dioxide is the best known GHG.39 It is the main byprod-
                                                                                                                      
32 See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? 2 Open 
Atmospheric Sci. J. 217, 229 (2008) [hereinafter Target CO2]. 
33 See James Hansen, Dir., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. Goddard Inst. for Space 
Studies, Briefing before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warm-
ing: Global Warming Twenty Years Later: Tipping Points Near ( June 23, 2008) [hereinafter 
Tipping Points]. 
34 See Target CO2, supra note 32, at 217. 
If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization de-
veloped and to which life on earth adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing 
climate change suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 
ppm to at most 350 ppm. . . . If the present overshoot of this target CO2 is not 
brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects. 
Id.; See Bill McKibben, Civilization’s Last Chance: The Planet Is Nearing a Tipping Point on Cli-
mate Change, and It Gets Much Worse Fast, L.A. Times, May 11, 2008, at M1; Tipping Points, 
supra note 33. 
35 See Synthesis Report, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
36 See Rick Mitchell, IPCC Official Says Industrialized Nations Must Cut Emissions Up to 95 
Percent, 39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1917 (Sept. 26, 2008). 
37 Robin Chase, Get Real on Global Warming Goals, Boston Globe, Apr. 22, 2008, at A15. 
38 Synthesis Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
39 Id. at 36. 
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uct of fossil fuel combustion and results from any energy production 
that burns oil, coal, natural gas, or other solid waste fuels.40 Eighty-one 
percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are from combustion of fossil 
fuels, and 83% of GHG emissions in the United States are attributable 
to CO2.41 More than one-third of CO2 emissions are attributable to the 
electric power sector.42 Global CO2 emissions are rising at the rate of 
approximately 10% per year.43 
 Prior to the Industrial Revolution, average Earth temperature had 
been naturally maintained at 59°F.44 Since the Industrial Revolution, 
carbon emissions resulting from combusting fossil fuels to provide me-
chanical and electrical energy have poured into the atmosphere.45 Cur-
rent atmospheric CO2 levels are approximately 33% higher than in pre-
industrial times.46 Temperature changes move in direct relation to at-
mospheric GHG concentrations.47 Within a century, if all nations of the 
world do not limit GHG emissions, average global temperatures will 
climb anywhere from 1.4°C–5.8°C.48 Consider the context: “In the last 
10,000 years, the Earth’s temperature hasn’t varied by more than 
1.8°F.”49 Global mean surface temperature rose 1.33°F over the last dec-
ade, and the rate of warming over the past fifty years has almost dou-
bled.50 
 More than just numbers, the changes associated with these fore-
casts about global warming have discernible impacts. For instance, the 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 30, 37. 
41 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE/EIA-0573(98), Emission of 
Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1998, at ix, x, 13 (1999). 
42 See id. at 22 tbl.5. 
43 See Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage Under the Sea, Sus-
tainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Fall 2006, at 22, 23 tbl.1. 
44 John Glenn, Program Manager, Wastewise Partner Forum—Using Climate Tools 
and Resources (Aug. 17, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/waste/partnerships/waste- 
wise/events/pubs/clipf_sum.pdf. 
45 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Global Warming Basics Introduction, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/about (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
46 Reitze, supra note 16, at 10,254 (“CO2 levels have increased from 270–280 ppm in 
pre-industrial times to more than 360 ppm in 1999, and continue to mount. Nitrous oxide 
levels increased from 270 ppm to 310 ppm and methane concentrations have increased 
from 770 ppb to 1700 ppb over the same period.”). 
47 Synthesis Report, supra note 2, at 5, 7 fig.5. 
48 Id. at 8 tbl.SPM.1. The IPCC 4th Assessment Report, talks of temperature increases 
ranging from 2.4°C–6.4°C. This would yield a 7–23 inch rise in sea levels during the twenty-
first century. Id. 
49 History.com, The Facts—Global Warming, http://www.history.com/states.do?action 
=detail&state=Global%20Warming&contentType=State_Generic&contentId=56815&par 
entId=earth (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
50 The Physical Science Basis, supra note 3, at 237. 
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extreme 5.8°C (approximately 10°F) increase in average global tem-
perature would not only lead to the starvation of hundreds of millions 
of people, but is forecasted to result in the mass extinction of half of 
the species on Earth.51 Global warming will reduce food production 
and crop yields in lower latitudes52 and promote the rapid spread of 
infectious diseases and cardiovascular diseases,53 while spurring compe-
tition for dwindling water resources.54 
 Long-term projections forecast no abatement in the warming 
trend associated with GHG emissions. Energy use and the construction 
of fossil-fuel-fired power generation facilities are increasing as popula-
tions grow and economic development continues, especially in devel-
oping nations.55 Unabated, this increase in power demand in develop-
ing nations will tip the global environmental thermostat and render 
irreversible the risks and consequences associated with global warming, 
regardless of the measures that the United States and other developed 
nations take to reign in their carbon emissions.56 If unaddressed, the 
annual increase in GHG emissions in India, China, Brazil, Indonesia, or 
any one of several dozen fast-growing nations, will swamp all of the col-
lective GHG reductions of the developed nations complying with 
Kyoto’s modest requirements.57 In particular, most of the expansion in 
                                                                                                                      
51 James Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. Rev. Books, July 13, 2006, at 12. 
52 See Working Group II of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability 296–97 (Martin Parry et al., eds. 2007). 
53 Id. at 407. 
54 Id. at 191. 
55 Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 28, at 31; World Bank, World Bank Statement, 
Ministerial Segment - COP11 - Montreal 4 (2005), available at http://siteresources.world- 
bank.org/ESSDNETWORK/Resources/MINISTERIALSEGMENTCOP11Montreal.pdf. 
56 The Physical Science Basis, supra note 3, at 33; Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The 
Algorithm of Carbon and International Development, 19 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 510, 512 (2008) 
[hereinafter Power Paradox]. 
57 Kyoto will not meet its target of achieving an average of 7% below 1990 GHG emis-
sion levels by 2012. It will not even be close. Between 1990 and 2004, the forty-one Annex I 
developed nations, excluding the countries with “economies in transition” (the failed for-
mer Soviet economies), increased GHG annual emissions by 12.1%. United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
Data for Period 1990–2004 and Status of Reporting, 8 fig.4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2006/26 
(Oct. 19, 2006). These developed countries were responsible for 18.6 billion tons of GHGs 
emitted annually. Id. at 7 fig.2. One hundred twenty-two developing nations reported 11.7 
billion tons of GHG emissions in 1994. UNFCCC, Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of National 
Communications from Parties Not Included in Annex I to the Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/ 
SBI/2005/18 (Oct. 25, 2005). Therefore, approximately 40% of GHGs are from develop-
ing countries. This may actually understate the percentage because only 122 of about 160 
developing nations are included in this U.N. report and database, and there may be data 
gaps and underreporting in some of the 122 countries that do report. Assuming that the 
Kyoto targets are achieved by 2020, a world reduction in carbon is only achieved if the 
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energy and power generation will occur in Asia during the next dec-
ades.58 
 Developed countries cannot solve the global warming problem 
alone. Even if all thirty-five developed Kyoto Annex I countries59 could 
achieve a reduction of 80% of their GHG emissions by 2050, the reduc-
tion would be insufficient to achieve Kyoto’s goals without vigorous par-
ticipation by developing countries.60 Therefore, it is essential that in-
ternational law is amended to provide a mechanism to significantly 
reduce GHG emissions in developing countries, particularly those 
emissions that are associated with electric power generation.61 Major 
developing countries will make their investments in energy infrastruc-
ture over the next decade; that provides a particularly tight window in 
which to make the best choices to achieve Kyoto’s goals.62 After all, en-
ergy choices and climate security are intertwined and must be ad-
dressed effectively at the same time.63 
                                                                                                                      
developing nations of the world don’t base their increasing electrification on carbon-based 
fuels. If the forty-one Annex I nations potentially regulated by Kyoto were to reduce their 
emissions by 20% from current levels, they would approximately achieve their Kyoto tar-
gets. Since these Annex I countries emit approximately 60% of global carbon, this would 
constitute an approximately 12% reduction in world carbon emissions. However, if the 
non-Annex I developing nations, representing about 40% of global carbon emissions, in-
crease their electricity demand(and other GHGs) by the forecast 4% annually between 
2007 and 2020, that is a cumulative compounded increase of about 60% of power use in 
that 40% share. World Energy Council, World Energy Assessment: Overview 2004, 
at 31 (2004). If those developing nations utilize predominately fossil fuels for this power 
sector expansion (and transportation fuels, etc.), it will increase their carbon emissions by 
24%. Thus, the carbon increase in developing nations could totally negate the carbon 
reductions that Kyoto seeks to achieve in Annex I developed countries. The use of fossil 
fuels for power generation in developing countries often employs older combustion tech-
nologies that do not utilize the most effective emission control technologies. Moreover, it 
is important to note that Kyoto is not achieving its targets in the Annex I countries with a 
composite 12% increase since 1990; therefore, these assumptions of success in the devel-
oped countries may be optimistic. See infra Part. II.C–D. 
58 Int’l Energy Agency, supra note 28, at 66. 
59 UNFCCC, List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, http://unfccc.int/parties_ 
and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (listing Kyoto 
Annex I countries). 
60 Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Agreement, Sustain-
able Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2008, at 2, 2. 
61 See Charles Davis, Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation Options, 
Carbon Control News, June 30, 2008 (LEXIS) (noting that in 2008, the EIA concluded 
that the electric power generation sector offered the most cost-effective opportunities to 
reduce CO2 emissions, compared to the transportation sector). 
62 Blair, supra note 14, at 10. 
63 El-Ashry, supra note 60, at 3. 
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II. The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol Legal Framework to 
Function in the International Context 
A. The Legal Choice of Global Chemicals 
 Seven commonly recognized compounds augment the process of 
climate change, and thus are classified as GHGs. Four of these com-
pounds are natural: (1) water vapor, which is not regulated; (2) CO2, 
released during combustion; (3) nitrous oxide (N2O), which mainly 
comes from animals; and (4) methane (CH4).64 Three other com-
pounds are synthesized by humans.65 One group consists of perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs), which are used in aluminum production, semi-conduc-
tors, and manufacturing.66 Another is hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
which are associated with refrigerants and fire extinguisher products.67 
The final compound is sulfur hexafluoride (SF
6
),68 the most potent 
GHG,69 amounting to 22,000 times the warming effect, molecule-for-
molecule, of CO2 over a 100-year period.70 
 The history of fluorocarbons under international environmental 
controls is itself a fascinating transposition in international means and 
ends. In 1987, the Montreal Protocol sought to phase out chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), such as Freon, in developed nations by 1996 and in 
developing nations by 2010 because they degraded the stratospheric 
ozone layer.71 Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which under the 
Montreal Protocol are to be phased out in developed nations by 2030 
and in developing nations between 2016 and 2040,72 are on a voluntary 
expedited phase out in the United States. Under section 606 of the 
Clean Air Act, HCFCs are to be phased out by 2010.73 
                                                                                                                      
64 Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Green-house Gases: Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/gases.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
65 Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE/EIA-0573(2002), Emissions of 
Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2002, at 63 (2003). 
66 Id. at 68–69. 
67 Id. at 64. 
68 Id. at 69. 
69 ScienceDaily, Sulfur Hexafluoride, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/s/sulfur_ 
hexafluoride.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
70 Energy Info. Admin., Comparison of Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC’s 
Second and Third Assessment Reports, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/archive/gg04-
rpt/global.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); ScienceDaily, supra note 69. 
71 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 2.A, Sept. 16, 
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
72 Id. art. 2.F. 
73 See Clean Air Act, § 606, 42 U.S.C. § 7671e (2006). 
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 Given these phase outs, the refrigeration industry turned to hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFCs) as a substitute. HCFCs are 90% less damaging to 
the ozone layer than CFCs.74 This transition to HCFCs addresses the 
stratospheric ozone problem under the Montreal Protocol; however 
HCFCs and HFCs have global warming potentials ranging from 90 to 
11,700 times that of CO2, depending on the specific HCFC or HFC 
compound.75 The environmental solution of substituting refrigerants to 
preserve the stratospheric ozone layer—seemingly a victory for interna-
tional environmental policy makers—may actually exacerbate global 
warming.76 
 Kyoto does not regulate all GHGs, but instead regulates six families 
of global warming chemicals.77 The combustion of fossil fuels results in 
64% of the total atmospheric CO2 introduced into the atmosphere 
since 1850.78 The regulated GHGs in Table 1 are displayed in descend-
ing order of their impacts on the environment, which is a function of 
their quantity released, their heat radiation properties, and their resi-
dence time in the atmosphere. 
Table 1: Key Facts About Greenhouse Gases 
GHG Global Warming 
Potential 
[CO2=1] 
Residency Time
[years] 
Amount of U.S. 
Total GHG Release 
[%]* 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 1 100 85 
Methane (CH4) 21 12 11 
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) 310 120 2 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HFCs) 140-11,700 Varies < 1 
Chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) 6,500 Varies < 1 
Hexafluoride (SF6) 23,900 Varies < 1 
See United Nations Environment Programme, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The 
Physical Science Basis 237, 212–13 tbl.2.14 (2007) 
 
                                                                                                                      
74 Steven Ferrey, The Law of Independent Power § 6:7.1(2009). 
75 The Physical Science Basis, supra note 3, at 212–13 tbl.2.14. 
76 See Sindya N. Bhanoo, Ozone Hole Is Mending. Now for the ‘But.,’ N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 
2010, at A7 (noting that some studies report that global warming may accelerate as the 
ozone hole mends due to changes in winds and cloud formation in the Antarctic). 
77 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Annex A, Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter 
Kyoto Protocol] (listing regulated greenhouse gases). The regulated heat-trapping green-
house gases do not include water vapor. Id. Water vapor in the atmosphere is created by 
the transpiration of cooler air passing over warmer water bodies. Id. Water vapor raises the 
temperature of Earth so that it is warm enough to be habitable. See id. 
78 Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr., Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
78 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:67 
 The molecule-by-molecule global warming impact of many of the 
secondary and less prevalent GHGs is significantly greater than CO2.79 
However, because these secondary GHGs are released in smaller quan-
tities and/or have shorter residence times in the atmosphere before 
they dissipate, CO2 remains the dominant GHG and therefore receives 
the greatest international policy focus.80 Reducing the most potent, less 
prevalent chemicals produces greater value by creating additional off-
sets or credits.81 Therefore, there is a choice of international law miti-
gation strategy that can look beyond regulating the emission of CO2.82 
 The common assumption has been that control of carbon will re-
sult in the implementation of renewable energy technologies as the 
new world energy base.83 Some form of renewable, power-generating 
resource is available to every party governed by the Kyoto Protocol 
(Kyoto). For instance, the amount of solar radiation reflecting off of 
the Earth is about 1000 times the Earth’s commercial energy use.84 This 
means that converting less than 1% of the appropriate land area of the 
Earth to utilize solar energy could satisfy much of the Earth’s electricity 
requirements when solar radiation is available.85 Storing that energy 
efficiently is another matter.86 
 However, this is not what the Kyoto Protocol is accomplishing.87 
Jim Hansen, widely regarded as the leading American climate scientist, 
gives the world less than a decade to dramatically reverse the growth 
and magnitude of global GHG emissions.88 To do this, there must be a 
massive shift in the power generating base from CO2-emitting fossil fu-
els to renewable power; this transition simply is not occurring under 
the Kyoto regime. 
                                                                                                                      
79 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA-230-R96-006, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Sinks 1990–1994, ES-2 (1994). 
80 See id. at ES-3 ESTable.1. 
81 See Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt 
Climate Change, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2007, at 3, 5 (discussing perversion 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism in destruction of HFCs). 
82 See infra Part III.B. 
83 See Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal “Additionality” Control-
ling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 591, 592 (2009). 
84 Jeffrey Sachs, U.S. Must Invest in Reinventing Energy, Korea Herald (Seoul), Apr. 24, 
2008 (LEXIS). 
85 See Posting of Ariel Schwartz to Sustainability Blog, http://www.fastcompany.com/- 
blog/ariel-schwartz/sustainability/infographic-how-much-surface-area-would-it-take-power- 
world-compl (Sept. 2, 2009, 10:44 EST). 
86 See generally Ferrey, supra note 74, § 2:2. 
87 See infra Parts III–IV. 
88 See Jim Hansen et al., Global Temperature Change, 103 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 14,288, 
14,293 (2006). 
2010] International Global Warming Regulation and Renewable Energy 79 
B. The Relevant Legal Pieces of the Kyoto Protocol 
 The Framework Convention on Climate Change treaty was agreed 
upon at the Rio de Janeiro United Nations (U.N.) Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in 1992 and the Kyoto convention in 
1997.89 The Rio Declaration articulated the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibility” and created the U.N. Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to administer a carbon mitigation 
scheme.90 One hundred seventy eight countries signed the Rio Declara-
tion.91 By February 2005, 55% of Annex I signatories (developed na-
tions) adopted the Kyoto Protocol, triggering the minimum ratification 
provision and allowing Kyoto to go into effect.92 More than 180 coun-
tries attended the Bali Conference in 2007,93 and as of 2007, 175 of 
these nations had ratified Kyoto.94 The United States has not ratified 
Kyoto, and Australia did not ratify it until December 2007.95 
 Developing nations successfully resisted efforts to include them in 
binding international obligations and opposed encouraging their vol-
untary commitments to GHG reduction.96 The rationale behind this 
decision is that Kyoto reflects “common but differentiated” responsibili-
ties between developed and developing countries.97 Under Kyoto, there 
is no responsibility assigned to developing countries. China, which is 
                                                                                                                      
89 See U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992); UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
90 Id. princ.7. 
91 World Res. Inst., Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, http://www.wri.org/publica- 
tion/content/8078 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
92 UNFCCC, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratifi- 
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93 See UNFCCC, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, http:// 
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html; UNFCCC, United States of America, http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?coun- 
try=US (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
96 Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United 
States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 27, 34 (1999). 
97 United Nations Conference on Climate Change: Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, art. 4, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 (“All Parties, 
taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities . . . .”). The concept 
was originally part of the Montreal Protocol. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 71, art. 5. 
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considered a developing country under Kyoto even though it is the 
largest CO2 emitter in the world, is not an Annex I country.98 India is 
not an Annex I country either.99 The Copenhagen Conference in De-
cember 2009 ended in no consensus on this issue.100 
 Kyoto requires the thirty-five Annex I nations to reduce CO2 emis-
sions by an average of 5% below 1990 baseline levels by 2012.101 The 
other GHGs must also be reduced to 5% below either their 1990 or 
1995 baseline levels between 2008 and 2012.102 Kyoto seeks to achieve 
these reductions through a cap-and-trade regulatory system. Each of 
the thirty-five developed, Annex I nations is allocated a national emis-
sions cap, which applies to certain large industrial emitters of carbon 
within these nations. In 1997, Kyoto assigned to each Annex I country a 
maximum quantity of GHG emissions for the period 2008 to 2012.103 At 
the end of each compliance period, each emitter must have acquired— 
through allocation from their governments or through purchase or 
trade of additional allocation credits—enough credits to cover its car-
bon emissions during that period. In essence, each emitter must cover 
its emissions with regulatory allowances or newly created offset credits 
to emit carbon. 
 Annex I countries must set up national registries to issue their as-
signed amount units (AAUs), which correspond to their legally binding 
cap under Kyoto.104 Registry removal units (RMUs), which reflect re-
moval of GHGs due to forestry and land-use practices, are tracked as 
                                                                                                                      
98 See UNFCCC, List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, http://unfccc.int/par- 
ties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (in-
cluding China in non-Annex I parties to Kyoto). 
99 Id. 
100 See Eric J. Lyman & Dean Scott, Delegates Reach Agreement in Copenhagen But Look to 
2010 for Resumption of Talks, 41 Env’t Rep (BNA) 40 ( Jan. 1, 2010). 
101 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 3, para. 1. While most countries have commit-
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Parties on Its Seventh Session, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 ( Jan. 21, 2002) 
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Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 1283 (4th ed. 2004); see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, 
art. 7, para. 4. 
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well.105 Each AAU and RMU is tracked with a unique serial number. 
AAUs and RMUs are converted into emission reduction units (ERUs) 
to facilitate international trade, which is allowed under Kyoto.106 For 
instance, any party can purchase European Union (E.U.) credits, even 
if the purchaser does not require them for compliance.107 
 Kyoto also includes the creation of offsets. The inclusion of offsets 
in a cap-and-trade system offers several advantages: First, they allow 
lower-cost reduction opportunities outside the capped countries to be 
pursued as lower-cost reduction options. Second, economic sectors that 
are covered by the carbon emissions caps can be the source for reduc-
tions. This can include emission sources not otherwise cost-effectively 
addressed. Third, offsets can promote technology transfer to develop-
ing countries. 
 The use of offsets increases the compliance options by decreasing 
the total costs of compliance.108 Industrial emitters in each country are 
able to trade emission credits.109 They may also create new credits 
through mechanisms that allow for the possession of additional credits. 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) and Joint Implementation 
( JI) projects are two such avenues for GHG emitters to accrue these 
additional credits. 
 CDMs allow projects that reduce GHGs in developing nations to 
earn CERs for each ton of CO2e of GHGs reduced.110 Those CERs are 
then traded or sold to entities in Annex I countries, which increases 
that country’s emissions cap allocation under Kyoto.111 CERs—other 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, 
Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
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Emissions Trading, supra note 110. “Credits earned after 2000 can be used to achieve 
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than those for afforestation—have a seven-year lifetime, with the possi-
bility of either two renewals for a total of twenty-one years or a single 
term of ten-years.112 CDM projects may only be pursued by Annex I 
countries.113 As of the end of 2006, the World Bank reports that 61% of 
CDM projects were located in China, 12% were in India, 7% were in 
other Asian countries, 10% were in Latin America, most significantly 
Brazil, and 3% were in Africa.114 
 The Kyoto Protocol process to register and verify CERs requires 
between eighteen to twenty-four months.115 It is estimated that the cost 
of developing a new methodology for approval of CDM projects is ap-
proximately $150,000.116 Methodologies often require an average of 
280 days for approval.117 The E.U. has announced that it may reduce 
CDM imports from outside the E.U. after 2012.118 
 A second mechanism for compliance is JI. JI allows developed na-
tion signatories to implement projects in their or other Annex I nations 
that remove GHGs or create additional carbon sinks.119 The carbon 
emission reductions are then quantified in an ERU.120 An ERU trans-
fers a unit of allowed carbon emissions from a selling country’s cap to 
the purchasing country’s cap. Unlike a CDM CER, which creates an 
additional emission unit added to the cap,121 a JI project transfers a 
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119 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 6. 
120 See id. 
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credit under the existing cap from one nation to another nation.122 
Whereas the CDM process creates additional room in the envelope of 
permissible carbon emissions by developed nations, the JI process trans-
fers a static quantity of existing allocated credits under the cap from 
one developed nation to another. “However, JI projects have less bur-
densome transaction costs than CDM projects” because “the former are 
approved and administered by the parties involved rather than the 
U.N. Kyoto Executive Board.”123 In addition, “they are not subject to 
detailed periodic monitoring.”124 
 CDM CERs and JI ERUs are required to be “additional” to baseline 
project emissions.125 This involves establishing an individual emissions 
baseline as well as taking account of sector reform initiatives, barriers to 
expansion, and sector expansion plans.126 Early entrants in the CDM 
protocol established guidelines of additionality that are not as stringent 
as the guidelines that are now in place.127 There are at least eight dif-
ferent tests of additionality, none of which are widely accepted as credi-
ble.128 Offset retailers often provided little information or claimed that 
their offsets were additional, but the U.S. GAO found that some sellers 
could not explain how they defined additional and could not provide a 
meaningful amount of verifiable information to buyers.129 This under-
mined the credibility of offsets, and could compromise the integrity of 
a carbon reduction system going forward.130 
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 The requirement for CDM CERs also includes the certification by 
the host developing nation that the project supports its goals for sus-
tainable development.131 Sustainable development has been defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”132 Long-
term renewable energy developments clearly satisfy this definition, 
while many of the other CDM projects that have created CERs may be 
more questionable.133 
 Taken together, these different forms of credits and offsets form a 
country’s emission cap. This cap includes assigned Kyoto credit units; 
RMUs from forestation projects that remove CO2 from the atmosphere; 
and JI ERUs and CDM CERs. Under the Kyoto Protocol CDM CERs, 
and JI ERUs can be used in future compliance to satisfy up to 2.5% of 
the party’s annual allowed emissions. However, CERs and ERUs ob-
tained prior to 2008 can be fully banked for use in the 2008–2012 com-
pliance period.134 Kyoto does not place limits on the use of excess al-
lowances other than that tradable allowances must be supplemental to 
significant domestic measures to reduce GHG emissions.135 
 In summary, the Kyoto Protocol collects thirty-five developed na-
tions into a voluntary agreement to limit their carbon emissions. Each 
of these nations decides how to impose these limitations on its local 
industries. The covered carbon emitters that need additional allow-
ances can either create or purchase them through JI or CDM projects. 
In both Kyoto Annex I countries and in the United States, trading plat-
forms have arisen in private markets allowing offsets trading.136 
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C. The Actual Response to Kyoto Requirements 
 A cap-and-trade system is generally deemed a more cost-effective 
means of eliminating carbon than a specific requirement to adopt re-
newable technologies.137 The Kyoto Protocol does not require the in-
stallation of renewable technologies, but rather requires the reduction 
of carbon emissions, which may or may not involve the installation of 
renewable power generation technologies.138 The installation of typical 
renewable technologies costs more than other options to reduce car-
bon emissions;139 therefore, this higher cost for renewable offset op-
tions is not the “low hanging fruit” for someone speculating in carbon 
offsets.140 Renewable options are estimated to require an investment of 
$200 billion over the next two decades just to hold world carbon emis-
sions at current levels, let alone reduce them.141 
 Electric power is the crucial carbon-emitting sector of world 
economies because of its contribution to global warming and, more 
importantly, because of its rate of growth. Electric power production 
accounts for 34% of fossil fuel consumption in the United States, it and 
accounts for 40% of the carbon released from the burning of such fu-
els.142 These emissions from stationary power production sources are 
increasing more quickly each year than emissions from other fossil fuel 
sources, including the transportation sector.143 At current rates of en-
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ergy development, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 will be 250% 
higher than their current levels.144 At that rate, the battle against warm-
ing will be lost.145 
 Deployment of renewable energy generation bases will be required 
to alter this trend. Renewable power is one of the few win-win scenarios 
for developing nations. Renewable energy can provide opportunities 
for poverty alleviation and enhances energy security by relying on do-
mestic resources.146 Renewable power generation in developing nations 
can also qualify to create additional CDM allowances through offsets.147 
 However, the CDM provision in the Kyoto Protocol has not gener-
ated these kinds of benefits. CDM projects to date have been limited to 
a small number of countries and only a few gases while making little 
contribution to the transition to sustainable, renewable technolo-
gies.148A report prepared by the Öko-Institut for the World Wildlife 
Fund found that many Kyoto CDM programs fail to support sustainable 
development in host CDM countries.149 Additionally, many of the CDM 
projects would have occurred notwithstanding CDM credit qualifica-
tion.150 The report highlighted that numerous projects in India failed 
to demonstrate their additionality from what would have been imple-
mented without CDM credit qualification.151 The report charged that 
future multilateral agency investments will be targeted at countries with 
the largest emissions, rather than those most needing a transition to 
renewable energy resources.152 This focus will result in the production 
of a large quantity of cheap carbon credits that allow businesses and 
developed countries to avoid a fast transition to renewable resources 
and/or to keep discharging copious quantities of CO2.153 
 Renewable power investments are not recognized as carbon offsets 
because “the emission reduction doesn’t occur at the site of the renew-
able generator,” but rather, it occurs in backing out other carbon-
                                                                                                                      
144 El-Ashry, supra note 60, at 4. 
145 See Hansen, supra note 51, at 12, 16. 
146 El-Ashry, supra note 60, at 3. 
147 See supra Part. II.B. 
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intensive generation.154 The intermittent nature of several renewable 
power sources and their integration with the power grid make each 
situation different. Environmental groups have questioned the addi-
tionality of renewable energy projects if their construction is not be-
cause of the value of the offset sale.155 The media has also questioned 
the credibility of CDM carbon offset projects156 and the efficacy of such 
offsets.157 
 It is not clear whether Kyoto’s goals translate to the logical de-
ployment of an expanded renewable energy base. There are enough 
available conventional fossil fuel resources in the intermediate term to 
make this a real choice.158 Resource economists believe that Asia has 
fossil fuel reserves that are sufficient to last for over 100 years.159 How-
ever, more than 90% of these fossil fuel reserves are coal, and several of 
these nations, most notably China and India, are already highly de-
pendent on coal as their principal energy source.160 In 2003 alone, 
China’s oil consumption jumped by nearly one-third, domestic coal 
production increased by 100 million tons, and electricity consumption 
rose by fifteen percent.161 India, in the latter part of 2008, sought to 
acquire ownership of existing coal mines in the United States and else-
where to fuel its coal-fired power industry.162 Looking to spend $4 bil-
lion, India stated that “money [was] not a problem.”163 
 The average annual growth rate in primary energy use in develop-
ing countries from 1990 to 2001 grew by 3.2% per year, compared to 
industrialized countries where growth over the same period was 1.5% 
annually.164 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) predicts a 2.3% per year 
increase in demand by developing countries over the next twenty 
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years.165 DOE also forecasts that energy demand in developing Asia will 
double over the next twenty-five years.166 The International Energy 
Agency (IEA), with its headquarters in Paris, forecasts that over half of 
all future energy demand will originate in China and India.167 
 “China and India harbor around one-quarter of the world’s coal 
reserves, and they are deploying them rapidly to fire electric power 
plants.”168 China is currently installing 1000 megawatts (MW) of coal 
power generation each week,169 and predictions are that by the year 
2030, coal-fired power in India and China will add 3000 million extra 
tons of CO2 to the atmosphere every year.170 Therefore, the additional 
CO2 emissions from China and India’s electric power sectors will total 
approximately 34% of all world CO2 emissions from all sources in 
2030.171 
 Urbanization and population growth in India have driven growth 
in India’s energy consumption during the last twenty years.172 By 2025, 
one-quarter of the world’s population will be living in Asian cities.173 
Some projections estimate that by 2030, China’s GHG emissions will 
more than triple,174 and Asia alone will emit 60% of the world’s carbon 
emissions.175 “China currently meets 70% of its electricity demand 
through coal plants, the most prolific emitters among fossil fuel plants 
in terms of both CO2 and particulate matter.”176 India also relies on 
coal, generating 57% of its electricity in coal-fired plants,177 and it has 
ambitions to add 90,000 MW in new capacity by 2012.178 In July 2009, 
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just before the G8 climate talks in L’Aquila, Italy, China and India re-
newed their refusals to commit to any mandatory GHG emission 
cuts.179 Furthermore, chaos, rather than consensus, ended the Copen-
hagen Conference, held in December of 2009.180 
 Before recently surpassing the United States for the highest gross 
carbon emissions, China’s total installed electric generation capacity 
grew from 65 gigawatts (GW) in 1980 to 353 GW in 2002, at the time 
making it the second largest carbon emitter in the world after the 
United States.181 China’s electricity demand between 1996 and 2000 
grew at an average rate of 6.3% annually, and it is expected to almost 
match this pace into the future.182 In order to avoid shortages and sat-
isfy demand, China will have to increase electric capacity by approxi-
mately 40 GW annually.183 At the December 2009 Copenhagen Confer-
ence, China stated only that it would reduce carbon intensity for 
production, while ambitiously increasing total carbon output.184 
 It is essential that renewable energy projects worldwide—especially 
those located in fast-growing and industrializing Asian countries— re-
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ceive funding in order to prevent these nations from becoming even 
more reliant on a high-carbon fossil fuel-based energy generation infra-
structure. At the Bonn International Conference on Renewable Ener-
gies in June 2004, China committed to adding about 6 GW of renewable 
energy annually until 2020.185 The IEA projected that it will require an 
investment of $16 trillion by 2030 to meet the world’s energy require-
ments, with $5 trillion of this amount allocated to electric power pro-
duction, primarily in Asia and Africa.186 In the ten years since the ratifi-
cation of the Kyoto Protocol, energy demand has expanded much more 
vigorously than the transition to renewable sources of power generation. 
D. CDM Projects: Investor Interests Versus Renewable Resources  
Needed in Developing Nations 
 CDM projects dominate the action compared to JI projects under 
Kyoto: the volume of CDM CERs created was approximately forty times 
that of JI ERUs in 2006.187 There are almost one thousand CDM pro-
jects, with twice that many in the project development pipeline.188 The 
existing CDM projects have generated 117 million issued CERs, with an 
estimated 2.6 billion CERs to be generated by 2012.189 
 The economic value of trading offsets for a price provides a mar-
ket incentive for both host CDM countries190 and CDM investors to 
maximize the number of CERs created rather than invest in a needed 
technological transition to new power sources.191 By 2012, the CDM 
mechanism will have produced enough carbon offsets to equal the car-
bon emissions of the United Kingdom over three years.192 By 2020, the 
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value of carbon credits and offsets is forecast to increase in value from 
$11.8 billion currently to $278 billion.193 
 Moreover, the impact of CDM projects has not been to promote 
appropriate renewable investments in developing countries, as much as 
it has served to create additional credits for Annex I countries.194 CDM 
projects to date have been limited to a number of countries and only a 
few gases, “with little contribution to sustainable development.”195 
There is no mandatory environmental or sustainability assessment in 
Kyoto CDM projects or public input, which was rejected as an in-
fringement on host country sovereignty.196 
 Stanford Law Professor, Michael Wara, noted that “[b]y January 1, 
2008, more than 1150 million tons (Mt) CO2 equivalent (CO2e) had 
been registered for delivery via the CDM by the end of the first compli-
ance period.”197 He noted further that a “small number of very large 
projects dominate the supply of CERs from registered projects. In fact, 
the forty-five largest projects,” which are only 5% of the total number of 
CDM projects, nonetheless “represent 64% of the total supply to the 
end of the [f]irst [c]ommitment [p]eriod.”198 The amount of projects 
in the CDM pipeline represents approximately 2.8% of Annex B coun-
tries’ 1990 GHG emissions for each year of the first commitment pe-
riod.199 
 There is one indisputable premise for carbon control: the long-
term success of climate warming control will involve financing a fun-
damental shift of power production to renewable resources, especially 
in developing countries. However, the Kyoto Protocol does not explic-
itly reflect this premise.200 CDMs treat carbon as a global commodity, 
ignoring its source or location and encouraging business to seek out 
and exploit the cheapest carbon-reduction technologies, regardless of 
whether or not they lead to replacement of the power-generating base 
with renewable alternatives.201 
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 In developing countries, CDMs encourage “cream-skimming” car-
bon reduction investments.202 For instance, developers of CDM projects 
in developing nations are trapping methane and flaring it,203 without 
turning it into renewable electricity in the process.204 Even in the 
United States, methane is flared to garner offsets, even though such 
flaring is not additional, and the methane could create power resources 
rather than just being flared as a waste material.205 These easy solutions 
to just flare methane reduce GHGs but perpetuate the community’s 
need for electricity from other traditional sources. Flaring converts the 
methane into CO2, which is a less potent GHG. However, burning 
methane in an engine is the ideal application because this process can 
produce electricity that would offset other fossil fuel-fired electric pro-
duction and/or serve as a local electricity need.206 Because of conver-
sion factors to equate GHG reduction into CO2es, some critics have ar-
gued that the Kyoto mechanism is overpaying for reduction of certain 
non-CO2 gases.207 Therefore, while the Kyoto Protocol CDM process 
encourages carbon reduction in developing countries, it does not al-
ways result in a substitution of renewable power for conventional fossil-
fuel power.208 Renewable energy projects account for 28% of CDM 
CERs. Methane capture and flaring projects— “mostly located at large 
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landfills, coal mines, and CAFOs [concentrated animal feeding opera-
tions]” —that do not produce electricity, account for 19% of CERs.209 
 The carbon offset market has misjudged regulatory risk, as well as 
market and host country risks, inherent in carbon offset markets. 
There are weak counterparts, often lower than anticipated administra-
tive capacity, and financing risks. The risk of CDM projects is a function 
of the following factors: 
• The level of CDM project experience in the host country where 
the host country’s track record contributes to reducing delivery 
risk; 
• The success of the host country base project, since subsequent re-
jects rely on the achievements of that base project; and 
• The degree of the design and construction risk of certain pro-
jects.210 
 If carbon credits become the biggest market in the world, as ex-
pected, the quality of the credits traded becomes a crucial factor. Ques-
tions have been raised as to whether the Kyoto Executive Board and 
panels have the ability to correctly police the incentive to inflate 
CERs.211 The typical CDM project now takes about 300 days from the 
comment period, which starts the validation process, to registration of 
the project.212 The value of carbon aggregators has plunged, with the 
share prices of five public carbon market makers and CDM develop-
ment companies plunging between 13 and 98% from mid-2007 to mid-
2008.213 
 The majority of CDM projects, which all must be sited in (non-
Annex I) developing countries, have been projects to reduce by-product 
emissions of trifluoromethane (HFC-23), a refrigerant.214 An HFC-23 
gas mitigation CDM project in a developing country does not shift or 
promote the power-generating base in either the developing host coun-
try or in the country which imports and counts the CDM CERs. While 
HFC-23 reduction does limit world carbon emissions, there must be a 
long-term fundamental shift to a renewable energy base. 
 To date, CERs address high global warming potential industrial 
gases such as HFC-23, nitrous oxide (N2O), and methane (CH4) emit-
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ted by landfills and CAFOs.215 Two relatively obscure industries—adipic 
acid and chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) production—dominate 
CDM projects.216 
Adipic acid is the feedstock for the production of nylon-66 
and releases abundant N2O as a production byproduct. 
HCFC-22 has two major applications. It is one of two major re-
frigerants that were phased in to replace the CFCs under the 
Montreal Protocol to Protect Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. HCFC-22 is also the primary feedstock in the 
production of Dupont Teflon.217 
 The relatively small refrigerant and Teflon industries represent 
nearly 55% of the supply of issued CERs in the CDM to date.218 Indeed, 
the industrial gas emissions that account for one-third of CDM reduc-
tions do not even occur in the developed world, not because of an ab-
sence of adipic acid or HCFC-22 manufacture, but because industries 
abate them voluntarily and destroy them.219 Producers of HCFC-22 in 
developing countries can earn twice the amount from CDM subsidies 
when compared with the sales of the primary product, thus tripling 
revenues and profits.220 “It appears quite likely that the sector is also 
gaming the system by modifying its behavior in order to generate extra 
credits that can then be sold to developed countries with compliance 
obligations.”221 
 Under the CDM, a profit-maximizer goes after non-fossil-fuel gases 
because one can rationally earn relatively more credits given a level of 
investment, even though that reduction technology may be more ex-
pensive per molecule conserved. Because of the 11,700 times greater 
CO2e credits earned from reducing a molecule of HFC emissions for an 
investment of $100 million, it generates CDM credit revenues worth 
$4.6 billion, an impressive return on investment.222 Ironically, HFC 
emitters earned almost twice as much from these HFC by-product re-
duction activities than they did from selling their refrigerant gases pro-
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duced as the salable commodity in the process.223 HFCs constitute less 
than 1% of GHGs, but they have received almost half of the investment 
in GHG mitigation.224 
 When one can reduce HFCs and create CDM offsets for less than 
$1/ CDM credit created, compared to renewable energy projects that 
can cost $10/credit created, the market is responding rationally when it 
favors investments in the former.225 Minimizing the costs of producing 
a CER by a factor of ten or greater is economically sound within the 
incentives and rewards of the Kyoto scheme. Market mechanisms favor 
the most cost-effective private investments in CERs rather than the pub-
licly optimal types of investments for the long-term welfare of the host 
country. 
 The problem is that HFC capture and destruction projects do 
nothing to shift the energy base of the world’s economies to sustain-
able, renewable technologies.226 The major necessary structural energy 
sector transformations to low-carbon technologies are not occurring. It 
is of note that CDM programs were originally a late minor add-on to 
the original Kyoto Protocol.227 However, they have become the regula-
tory conduit for altering the key carbon-emitting activities of world 
economies.228 
 Emphasis on HFC-23 containment in the market, rather than a 
transition to renewable generation and sustainable development alter-
natives, is manifest.229 While these HFC reductions do limit world car-
bon emissions, the long-term success of global warming mitigation 
must involve financing a fundamental shift of power production to re-
newable resources, especially in developing countries.230 
 The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the “evi-
dence indicates that the CDM has had a limited effect on sustainable 
development.”231 GAO concluded that by encouraging the lowest-cost 
means for a developer to reduce carbon, the CDM scheme disadvan-
tages measures that contribute to sustainable development.232 It also 
concluded that CDM projects have not been successful in promoting 
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technology transfer, and that such technology transfer was most likely 
to occur to assist renewable power development.233 GAO concluded 
that the emphasis on reduction of HFC-23 GHGs “do little to promote 
efficient energy use or contribute to long-term sustainable develop-
ment objectives.”234 GAO determined that because of the very empha-
sis of CDM on low-cost GHG projects, it may not be able to encourage 
development of projects that promote sustainable development.235 
 With some scientists suggesting that we have less than a decade to 
achieve a significant world reduction in carbon emissions before the 
effects of global warming become irreversible, time is of the essence.236 
However, there is little prospect that renewable energy will emerge as 
the focus of near- or intermediate-term efforts. Permitting and con-
structing renewable energy projects require significant lead time. Fur-
thermore, no reauthorization of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to take 
effect for at least another 3 years. 
E. The Residual Preference for King Coal Alternatives 
 None of the countries with the largest coal reserves—the United 
States, China, India, and Indonesia—has a carbon policy to regulate 
the release of CO2 from the deployment of such coal reserves. None of 
these four counties is regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. About 40% of 
carbon emissions in the United States are attributed to coal-fired elec-
tricity generation.237 The Sierra Club has made the closure of all coal-
fried power plants in the United States its Beyond Coal Campaign.238 It 
has been predicted that Russia’s CO2 emissions will climb dramatically 
by 2020 due to a 123% increase in Russia’s coal consumption.239 Over 
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the next five years, Italy is expected to more than double the percent-
age of coal used to generate electricity.240 Germany, England, and other 
major European countries also are planning new coal plants.241 
 This is contrary to the recommendation of climate scientist James 
Hansen: “Building new coal-fired power plants is ill conceived . . . . We 
need a moratorium on coal now, with phase-out of existing plants over 
the next two decades.”242 However, coal remains attractive to power 
suppliers because of its abundance, its dispersion as an energy resource 
across mineral seams in many countries, and the fact that there is no 
coal cartel, as there is with oil producers. 
 However, consumption of energy is increasing exponentially as 
population increases and the energy intensity of (particularly develop-
ing) nations increases. China and India are building almost two new 
coal plants each week.243 According to former British Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, “the vast majority of new power stations in China and India 
will be coal-fired; not ‘may be coal-fired’, will be.”244 
 As noted above, “China and India harbor around one-quarter of 
the world’s coal reserves,”245 and both nations are deploying them rap-
idly to fire electric power plants.246 China’s future energy use is pro-
jected to grow faster than its GDP.247 “Over two-thirds of its energy is 
produced from coal.”248 China is currently installing over 1 GW of coal 
power generation each week, and predictions are that by the year 2030, 
coal-fired power in India and China will add 3000 million extra tons of 
CO2 to the atmosphere every year.249 China plans to build almost 200 
additional coal plants over a few years. In 2007, China built more new 
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coal-fired power plants than Britain, the seat of the coal-fired industrial 
revolution, built in its entire history.250 
 India, with 1.1 billion people, is the second most populous nation 
in the world. According to the EIA, it also contains the world’s fourth 
largest coal reserves.251 India maintains about 144,000 MW of genera-
tion capacity,252 compared to over 600,000 MW in China253 and ap-
proximately 1,000,000 MW in the United States.254 Furthermore, 70% 
of India’s electricity comes from coal,255 and India has targeted 65,000 
MW in new power generation capacity over the next ten years.256 
 China currently meets 70% of its electricity demand through coal 
plants, which are the most prolific emitters among fossil fuel plants in 
terms of both CO2 and particulate matter.257 China uses its coal re-
sources to a greater degree than the United States uses its domestic 
coal resources.258 If China used energy as the United States does, world 
energy consumption would double; satisfying China’s oil demand 
would require oil production equal to 500% of Saudi Arabia’s current 
oil production.259 China would also have to produce 600% more 
coal.260 Each year, China adds forty times more new coal capacity than 
new wind power.261 It is no wonder that China now contains seven of 
the ten most (air) polluted cities in the world.262 
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pdf. 
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 The challenge is substantial. “The stakes, for all life on the planet, 
surpass those of any previous crisis.”263 “If we stay our present course, 
using fossil fuels to feed a growing appetite for energy-intensive life 
styles, we will soon leave the climate of the Holocene, the world of prior 
human history.”264 Does this work in a carbon-constrained age? “The 
single-point nature of power plants’ emissions, the centralized nature 
of most power plant decisions in developing nations, and the exploding 
demand for electricity, make electricity generating-plants the logical 
choice for a frontal assault on GHG emissions.”265 
III. The Fatal Disconnects: Developing Nations’ Forests and 
the Chemical Reality 
We are recklessly burning and clearing our forests and driving more and 
more species into extinction. The very web of life on which we depend is being 
ripped and frayed. 
—Al Gore266 
A. Forest Preservation Ineligibility Under Kyoto 
 Kyoto does not cover developing countries,267 and in some ways 
even fails to speak their language.268 Developing countries harbor some 
of the great forests of the world: the great rain forests of South America 
and Indonesia are just two examples. Forests should be looked at as an 
opportunity to sequester carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, 
rather than the proposed controversial sequestration underground in 
                                                                                                                      
263 Target CO2, supra note 32, at 229. 
264 Id. at 228. 
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mines or in the ocean.269 The carbon market creates an opportunity to 
radically alter forest management and improve livelihoods in rural ar-
eas of developing countries.270 Forest preservation is most valuable in 
the tropics, as forests in snowy climates can retard the reflection of 
warmth by snow cover.271 Forest preservation plays a critical role in 
mitigating climate change.272 Annually in the world, about 32 million 
acres (13 million hectares) of forest are destroyed and not replanted.273 
 The net concentration of CO2 in the environment is a function not 
only of the output of CO2, but the conversion of CO2. Up to 20% of 
annual greenhouse gases (GHGs) are linked to deforestation.274 That 
conversion is accomplished by the plant canopy. Leading carbon scien-
tists have submitted that the way to reduce carbon concentrations to 
even 90% of current levels is to adopt “forestry practices that sequester 
carbon” or there will be “irreversible catastrophic effects.”275 
 To illustrate the importance of forest preservation and replant-
ing/afforestation, the United States estimates that in 2006 it had 7054 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) emissions, but 
that carbon sinks absorbed or converted approximately 900 million 
metric tons of these CO2es, reducing the total to 6170 net million met-
ric tons of emissions.276 The carbon stored in the existing forests of the 
contiguous forty-eight states equal about twenty years of industrial car-
bon emissions in the United States.277 
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Sinks: 1990–2006 ES-6 tbl.ES-2 (2008). 
277 See Ann Ingerson & Wendy Loya, The Wilderness Soc’y, Measuring Forest Carbon: 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Tools, Sci. & Pol’y Brief, Apr. 2008, at 1, 8, available at 
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 Deforestation accounts for 18–25% of global carbon emissions.278 
A World Bank report in 2007 found that 83% of Indonesia’s annual 
GHG emissions and 60% of Brazil’s GHG emissions come from the de-
struction of their forests.279 Collectively, these emissions account for 
almost 10% of the world’s total emissions of GHGs.280 Deforestation 
destroys forests equal to the size of Portugal each year, and the resulting 
change in land use accounts for 18% of global GHG emissions.281 Half 
of this destruction is from illegal logging that is not effectively po-
liced.282 
 Yet, the Kyoto Protocol does not recognize this reality. Under 
Kyoto, offset carbon credits can be obtained for planting trees but not 
for preserving existing forests even though these existing forests are 
life’s buffer against global warming.283 A new Australian study claims 
that natural forests are 60% more efficient in mitigating CO2 than re-
placement forests.284 So perhaps preservation of forests, which is not 
eligible to create any credits under either Kyoto or the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), are more critical than afforestation 
of new areas, which are eligible.285 If so, there is a significant carbon 
                                                                                                                      
278 Andrew W. Mitchell et al., Global Canopy Programme, Forests First in the 
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sequestration loss once original natural forest is destroyed and replaced 
with new afforestation acreage. 
 Efforts of some developing countries to include avoiding defores-
tation as a CDM project was tabled in 2005 meetings, and not resolved 
at the Bali Kyoto meetings in late 2007.286 Kyoto parties have tabled un-
til 2012 conservation of forests. Consequently, the most cost-effective 
solution in developing countries is off the Kyoto table. 
 No credit of any kind is given to developing countries—or any 
countries for that matter—for preserving forest. Leading up to Kyoto, 
developed nations objected to such credit, arguing that it would be dif-
ficult to monitor and measure the amount actually preserved, as well as 
to ensure that preservation would endure over time.287 There is no ef-
fective enforcement or incentive for the protection of forest cover.288 
This is something that many developing nations have in abundance—
especially Brazil and Indonesia with the world‘s two largest rain for-
ests—yet are not protecting. Thankfully, some modest demonstration 
programs on preserving forests were finally launched in 2008.289 
 For forestation projects, the integrity and credibility of offsets is 
one of the controversial issues.290 Whether the forestation is “addi-
tional,” monitored, and verified are issues as well. Legal additionality 
goes to the issue of whether the project would have happened anyway 
without qualifying as an offset.291 In the RGGI scheme, only afforesta-
tion on land that has not been a forest for at least 10 years and is cov-
ered by a permanent conservation easement counts for creating an off-
set.292 
 Effective adaptation of forests, agriculture, and water resources will 
require the broad planning and regulatory capacity of a range of minis-
tries in developing countries. Enhancements of these capabilities will 
require aid for international frameworks. 
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B. Black Carbon: A Chemical of Concern That Is Ignored by the Kyoto Protocol 
 As set forth earlier, the Kyoto Protocol does not include all key 
warming chemicals.293 Black carbon (BC) particulate emissions have 
recently been identified as the second most important climate chang-
ing agent, trapping heat as an aerosol, and changing the albedo of 
snow and ice.294 “[E]missions of black carbon are the second strongest 
contribution to current global warming, after carbon dioxide emis-
sions,” according to Dr. V. Ramanathan and Dr. G. Carmichael.295 
 BC, also known as soot, is a significant but underappreciated GHG 
emission of concern. BC is an important warming chemical, particu-
larly in the Arctic and the Himalayas, that has an especially pronounced 
effect on the loss of the west Antarctic ice sheets.296 According to Dr. 
James Hansen and Dr. Larissa Nazarenko “Soot deposition increases 
surface melt on ice masses, and the meltwater spurs multiple radiative 
and dynamical feedback processes that accelerate ice disintegration.”297 
 If Dr. Hansen and Dr. Nazarenko’s assertion is true, the irony is 
that the two most important chemical emissions affecting warming are 
not covered by the Kyoto Protocol or other international global warm-
ing regulation mechanisms. The most significant global warming gas, 
water vapor,298 is not covered under any global warming regulatory 
schemes.299 BC is not covered in any way under the Kyoto Protocol, nor 
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did it appear on the 2007 Kyoto Protocol Bali agenda for future re-
forms.300 
 However, the omission of BC is of particular significance: regula-
tion of BC, “particularly from fossil fuels, is very likely to be the fastest 
method of slowing global warming” in the immediate future.301 Accord-
ing to Dr. Mark Jacobson, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engi-
neering at Stanford University, major cuts in soot emissions could slow 
the effects of climate change for ten to twenty years, giving policymak-
ers more time to address CO2 emissions.302 This is an extension of 
global warming tools that policymakers will require given the lack of 
progress on global warming during the decade immediately following 
the adoption of Kyoto.303 Dr. Jacobson states that BC from fossil fuel 
and biofuel soot “may contribute to about 16% of gross global warming 
. . . but its control in isolation could reduce 40% of net global warming” 
minus cooling from all negative radiative forcings (for example, sul-
fates).304 What makes this complex to factor into the GHG equation is 
that reducing aerosols that are not BC could actually increase global 
temperatures by up to 2.4°C.305 
 Of the BC emissions total, about 20% of BC is emitted from burning 
biofuels, 40% from fossil fuels, and 40% from open biomass burning.306 
Ramanathan and Carmichael estimate that “[p]roviding alternative en-
ergy-efficient and smoke-free cookers and introducing transferring tech-
nology for reducing soot emissions from coal combustion in small indus-
tries could have major impacts on the radiative forcing due to soot.”307 
Simultaneously, reducing BC emissions could save up to 3 million lives a 
year that otherwise would be lost to air pollution.308 
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 Today, unlike the policy focus on CO2, the overwhelming majority 
of BC emissions is from developing countries309 and is expected to in-
crease.310 The largest sources of ambient BC emissions are in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa.311 China and India alone account for 25–
35% of total global BC emissions,312 with emissions from China dou-
bling from 2000 to 2006.313 The BC concentration hotspots include 
“the Indo-Gangetic plains in South Asia; eastern China; most of South-
east Asia including Indonesia; regions of Africa between sub-Sahara 
and South Africa; Mexico and Central America; and most of Brazil and 
Peru in South America.”314 As a whole, these regions of the world are 
home to 3 billion people, representing half the world’s population.315 
 In contrast to the developing world, “developed nations have re-
duced their black carbon emissions from fossil fuel sources by a factor 
of 5 or more since the 1950s.”316 Attention on the power generation 
sector in Asia would be one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce BC 
emissions of.317 But here, tools addressing BC emissions are not con-
tained in Kyoto. Developing countries have not made this transition, 
and will not do so quickly without mechanisms in the international le-
gal protocols.318 
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IV. The Essential New International Role 
A. The Point in Time 
 Since greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted anywhere migrate and 
result in the warming of the entire Earth,319 their impacts are not lim-
ited to local environments but are global in scope.320 This is contrary to 
many conventional pollutants that are regulated because their emis-
sions have a significant impact on the ambient air quality of the imme-
diately surrounding environment.321 The critical role for developing 
nations as they quickly increase electrification for their populations is 
their potential to develop renewable resources and to shift their re-
source bases as they rapidly expand their electricity generation capacity 
and electrify over the next decade and beyond.322 
 Unlike fossil fuels, renewable resources are widely disseminated 
across the globe. While many nations—particularly developing na-
tions—do not have significant fossil fuel reserves do not have signifi-
cant reserves of oil, coal, or natural gas, every nation has significant 
renewable energy in some form: hydropower, sunlight, wind, agricul-
tural biomass waste, wood, ocean wave power, etc.323 But unless Kyoto, 
or similar international mechanisms, promotes these technologies, de-
veloping nations will not deploy these options, which are often more 
expensive to implement.324 They will instead opt to burn coal and other 
fossil fuels. 
 This technology choice is critical in developing nations. The world 
stands at a crossroad in time because in the next decade there will be a 
massive investment in electrification of developing nations.325 During 
the next decade, developing nations will choose whether to deploy 
                                                                                                                      
319 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
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conventional fossil-fuel fired or sustainable renewable options to gen-
erate electricity. Once installed, those facilities will remain in place and 
contribute—or not so contribute—to global warming for about forty 
years or more. Choices in energy technology made now certainly will be 
the signature of our carbon footprint during the crucial period of the 
next half century, during which global warming may pass the point of 
no return.326 
B. The Critical International Agency Role 
1. The Role of International Multilateral Agencies 
 The World Bank Group is a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions and is a conglomeration of multiple entities,327 including: 
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
• International Development Agency (IDA), 
• International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
• Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF).328 
 Each World Bank agency specializes in the financing of different 
aspects of projects based primarily on the type of financing provided. 
The World Bank Group is funded primarily through borrowings on the 
international capital markets and is one of the largest sources of financ-
ing for energy sector projects in developing countries.329 The cumula-
tive lending of the first four World Bank entities is about $500 billion, 
with current annual lending of about $23 billion.330 
 As of June 2007, IBRD has provided approximately $433 billion in 
cumulative lending.331 In 2007, IBRD provided a total of $12.8 billion 
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in financing to 112 different projects.332 Of this, IBRD, in conjunction 
with IDA, spent more than $1.7 billion on energy infrastructure and 
service development.333 Moreover, the World Bank spent $2.7 billion 
funding legal and policy reforms.334 IBRD and IDA energy and mining 
sectors investments in South Asia and East Asia are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: World Bank Lending to Energy & Mining Sectors in East Asia/Pacific and 
South Asia from 1994 to 2003 (in millions of dollars) 
Location 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
East Asia 314.5 254.3 67.2 359.1 425.2 118.5 
South Asia 504.8 150.6 130.8 83.6 483.0 243.7 
 World Bank, The World Bank Annual Report 2007, at 35 tbl.2.2, 39 tbl.2.3 (2007). 
 
 IDA was created by the World Bank in 1960, and it currently has 
169 member countries.335 IDA is supported by governmental contribu-
tions and provides interest-free credits and grants to countries with the 
lowest levels of per capita income.336 In fiscal year 2009, IDA commit-
ments totaled $14 billion, 18% of which was provided on grant 
terms.337 “Since its inception, IDA credits and grants have totaled 
[]$207 billion, averaging []$12 billion a year in recent years and direct-
ing the largest share, about 50 percent, to Africa.”338 
 MIGA was created in 1988 as a member of the World Bank Group 
to promote foreign direct investment into emerging economies to sup-
port economic growth, reduce poverty,339 and improve people’s lives.340 
MIGA began operations in 1988 as an independent branch of the 
World Bank Group and has supported various projects in twenty-seven 
African countries.341 MIGA instruments provide equity financing, usu-
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339 For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2007, MIGA issued $1.4 billion in investment 
guarantees (insurance) for twenty-nine projects in developing countries. World Bank 
Group Multilateral Inv. Guarantee Agency [MIGA], 2007 Annual Report 2 tbl.1 
(2007) [hereinafter MIGA 2007 Annual Report]. 
340 See MIGA, About MIGA, http://www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1736 (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
341 MIGA 2007 Annual Report, supra note 339, at 11. 
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ally in the form of political risk insurance, to insure against noncom-
mercial risks in developing countries.342 MIGA instruments can provide 
up to twenty-year coverage for certain risks,343 including currency trans-
fer restrictions, war and civil disturbance, expropriation, and breach of 
contract by the host government.344 MIGA is willing to cover a variety of 
investments, including shareholder loans, loan guarantees by equity 
holders, and commercial bank loans.345 In 2007, MIGA provided $1.4 
billion in new guarantees.346 
 The IFC was founded in 1956 with the purpose of financing pri-
vate sector projects and providing advisory services.347 IFC currently is 
comprised of 182 member countries.348 The IFC is legally and finan-
cially independent of the rest of the World Bank; however, it coordi-
nates its activities with other Bank institutions. About 30% of its budget 
goes to the energy sector, with oil and gas projects commanding a sig-
nificant portion of these expenditures.349 As of 2008, the IFC is com-
mitted to scaling up its activities in renewable energy350 and energy effi-
ciency investments.351 IFC has a unit within its infrastructure 
department that focuses on investments in renewable energy projects 
and other GHG-friendly technologies, and it is examining several pos-
                                                                                                                      
342 See MIGA, Guarantees Overview, http://www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm? 
stid=1509 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter MIGA Guarantees Overview]. 
343 MIGA, Terms and Conditions, http://www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm? 
stid=1550 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). “Since its inception in 1988, MIGA has issued 952 
guarantees for projects in 100 developing countries, totaling $20.9 billion in coverage. 29.2 
percent of MIGA’s gross outstanding portfolio is in IDA-eligible (world’s poorest) coun-
tries. MIGA’s gross exposure stands at $7.3 billion.” MIGA, Guarantees Projects, http:// 
www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm?stid=1546 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
344 See MIGA Guarantees Overview, supra note 342. 
345 MIGA, Investment Guarantee Guide 4 (2006), available at http://www.miga.org/ 
documents/IGG06+pa.pdf. 
346 World Bank Annual Report 2007, supra note 332, at 64. 
347 World Bank Int’l Fin. Corp. [IFC], About IFC, http://www.ifc.org/about (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2010). 
348 IFC, About IFC: Member Countries, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/ 
Member_Countries (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
349 Fritsche & Matthes, supra note 330, at 43–44, 44 tbl.5. 
350 “The IFC has since revised its methodology so that it now identifies renewable energy 
and energy efficiency investments in commitments it has made in other sectors, such as agri-
culture, water supply, industry, and transport, and in corporate loans to financial intermedi-
aries.” IFC, Catalyzing Private Investment for a Low-Carbon Economy: World Bank 
Group Progress on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Fiscal 2007, at 49 
(2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENERGY/Resources/renewable 
energy12407SCREEN.pdf. 
351 IFC, FY09–11 Business Plan and Budget 16 (2008). 
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sible wind power projects.352 Private parties use IFC financing to gain 
access to new sources of funding. Sources of project financing provided 
by the IFC include long-term loans, equity investments, subordinated 
loans, guarantees, standby financing, and risk management.353 
 In 1999, shortly after the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, interna-
tional agreement created the Prototype Carbon Fund (“PCF” or the 
“Fund”).354 PCF is a partnership of public and private stakeholders that 
share a vision of GHG reduction.355 Participating governments include 
Finland, Canada, the Netherlands,356 Norway, and Sweden.357 Private 
participants include international financing institutions and interna-
tional energy corporations.358 
 The purpose of the PCF is to help finance359 and monitor pro-
grams360 designed to reduce GHG emissions361 and generate emissions 
                                                                                                                      
352 See IFC, Infrastructure: Power, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/infrastructure.nsf/Con- 
tent/Power (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
353 See IFC, The IFC Difference: 2001 Annual Report 22 (2001), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/annualreport.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AR2001_English_Vol1/$
FILE/AR2001_English_Vol1.pdf. 
354 Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, Prototype Carbon Fund, http://go.worldbank. 
org/734QNOM2F0 [hereinafter World Bank PCF] (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
355 See Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, About Prototype Carbon Fund, http://wb car- 
bonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=PCF&FID=9707&ItemID=9707&ft=About (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
356 On May 7, 2002, the World Bank and the government of the Netherlands signed an 
agreement which established The Netherlands Clean Development Facility. See generally 
Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, The Netherlands CDM Facility, http://wbcarbonfi- 
nance.org/Router.cfm?Page=NCDMF&FID=9711&ItemID=9711&ft=About (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
357 Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, Annual Report 2008: Carbon Finance for 
Sustainable Development 23 (2008), available at http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/ 
2008_Annual_Report_CF08_Final_printed_Low_Res_04-29-09.pdf. 
358 Id. 
359 Bank Info. Ctr. et al., How the World Bank’s Energy Framework Sells the 
Climate and Poor People Short: A Civil Society Response to the World Bank’s 
Investment Framework for Clean Energy and Development 12 (2006), available at 
http://www.bicusa.org/proxy/Document.9515.aspx. The Bank has become the largest 
public broker of carbon purchases, with up to $1 billion in its carbon credit portfolio. Id. 
The World Bank makes between 5–10% in commissions on all the carbon credits it pur-
chases for the fund it administers, which has the potential to amount to a $100 million 
profit. See id. 
360 See Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, Annex I, Document 6A, Prototype Carbon 
Fund 1, http://www.ambiente.gov.ec/WEB/Cambio%20Clim%E1tico%20en%20Ecuador/ 
UCC/Anexo1/PCF%20(Anexo%201,%20Documento%206a).pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
“A major emphasis will be directed at development of projects in the area of renewable en-
ergy technology such as, but not limited to, geothermal, wind, solar and small-scale hydro 
energy projects.” Id. at 3. 
361 See id. at 1. 
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reduction credits,362 which can be registered363 pursuant to article 12 of 
Kyoto.364 PCF creates a market in carbon credits that have traded at 
about $3–4/ton of CO2 equivalents.365 Most PCF funds have gone to 
Latin America, with only 7% to Central Asia, 2% to East Asia, 7% to 
South Asia, and 18% to Africa.366 
 PCF has approximately $247 million in active pipeline projects.367 
The Fund provides technical assistance368 for countries developing 
                                                                                                                      
For many decades, the World Bank’s energy lending has focused on central-
ized, large-scale, grid-based thermal and hydropower projects and on the pri-
vatization of public power utilities. This report shows that in spite of many 
promises to “green” its energy lending over the past 15 years, the World 
Bank’s energy sector portfolio still fails to reap the double dividend of renew-
able energy technologies that would fight both poverty and climate change. 
The Bank continues to invest $2 to $3 billion a year in greenhouse gas-
producing energy projects, which fuel climate change and fail to help the 
world’s poor. Financing for renewable energy projects makes up less than 5 
percent of the Bank’s overall energy financing [as of] fiscal year 2005. 
Bank Info. Ctr. et al., supra note 359, at 12. 
362 See Press Release, World Bank, Prototype Carbon Fund Shows that Kyoto Protocol 
Works, (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://go.worldbank.org/5DSI1BEWV0 (“One of the 
objectives of the $145 million Fund . . . is to demonstrate how [GHG] emissions reductions 
generated by CDM and JI projects can contribute to sustainable development and lower 
the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.”). 
363See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 12. The Carbon Fund for Europe (CFE) “is 
designed to help European countries meet their commitments to the Kyoto Protocol and 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme.” Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, 
Carbon Fund for Europe, http://go.worldbank.org/BAP5Z2LYQ0 (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010). The CFE is a trust fund established by the World Bank in cooperation with the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). Id. “The Fund will purchase greenhouse gas emission 
reductions through the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM and JI from climate-friendly investment 
projects from either bank’s portfolio as well as from self-standing projects.” Id. 
364 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 12. 
365 See generally Point Carbon, Carbon, http://www.pointcarbon.com/productsandser- 
vices/carbon/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing up to the minute pricing information 
related to carbon trades). 
366 Fritsche & Matthes, supra note 330, at 60. It has funded wind, waste manage-
ment, bagasse, biomass, energy efficiency, geothermal, small hydro, and photovoltaic 
technologies. Id. 
367 Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank, PCF Performance 2003: PCF Portfolio 
Development 2 (2003), available at http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/PCF_AR033.html. 
368 See Carbon Finance Unit, supra note 357, at 9. 
As a prototype fund, the PCF has a vastly diverse portfolio in terms of tech-
nology distribution. Renewable energy projects—including wind, hydro, geo-
thermal, bagasse and biomass—dominate the portfolio, representing 37% of 
the value of the PCF’s emission reduction purchases. The portfolio also in-
cludes emission reduction purchases from projects involved in HFC-23 de-
struction, coalmine methane, energy efficiency, waste management and lan-
duse, land-use change and forestry . . . . 
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emissions trading programs pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol,369 trebling 
its amount of technical training assistance in carbon financing.370 The 
Fund will be extinguished once private sector markets develop.371 “As a 
pilot activity, the PCF does not endeavor to compete in the emission 
reductions market; it is restricted to []$150 million and is scheduled to 
terminate in 2012.”372 For PCF, one means of reducing carbon emis-
sions is paying for verified reductions in carbon emissions.373 Payments 
are made specifically to projects that have executed emissions reduc-
tions contracts with PCF. As with all international financing transac-
tions, PCF engages in risk management to ensure actual reductions and 
constant payment streams.374 
 The divisions of the World Bank cannot manufacture investments. 
All investments must be approved by and accepted by local state au-
thorities in the host country.375 The World Bank is not itself a govern-
ing body over nations, but rather a financial aid conduit for projects 
allowed by member developing nations. Currently, the World Bank is 
undergoing a shift in funding priorities with the emergence of world 
concern about global warming.376 Nor is the World Bank designated as 
the primary or the only means of financing CDM projects. The World 
Bank has been responsible for about one-quarter of the approved pro-
tocols for CDM project development, so while a significant participant, 
these areas are not exclusively its province.377 The World Bank Group 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 25. 
369 See id. at 9, 25–26. 
370 See World Bank PCF, supra note 354. 
371 See id. 
372 Id. 
373 Charlotte Streck, New Partnerships in Global Environmental Policy: The Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism, 13 J. Env’t & Dev. 295, 314 (2004). 
The PCF provides financial resources for projects that are intended to gener-
ate GHG emission reductions in return for the right to have transferred to 
PCF contributors, or so-called participants in the PCF, a pro rata share of the 
emission reductions, verified and certified in accordance with the Emission 
Reductions Purchase Agreement with the respective project sponsor. 
Id. 
374 See World Bank, Annual Report 2007, supra note 332, at 22–23. 
375 See UNFCCC, About Clean Development Mechanism, http://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
about/index.html (last visited Feb. 10. 2010). 
376 See World Bank, Annual Report 2007, supra note 332, at 19. 
377 See generally World Bank, The Role of the World Bank Group in Carbon Fi-
nance: A Role for Further Engagement (2006) (discussing the World Bank’s efforts to 
respond to the global warming crisis). 
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has funded more than $6.3 billion in renewable energy projects since 
1990.378 
 Nonetheless, the position of the World Bank as the primary inter-
national public sector lender is important. Its practices influence the 
lending of regional development banks around the world, national ex-
port banks in major developed countries, and private banks, which all 
underwrite and support infrastructure development.379 More than 80% 
of project financing in developing countries is provided by private 
banks which have adopted the Equator Principles380 for lending, and 
which look for guidance to the World Bank.381 What the World Bank 
does and supports is a critical key starting point. 
2. International Agency Criticism 
 The efforts of international agencies regarding carbon reduction 
have come under recent criticism. House Financial Services Chairman, 
Barney Frank, voiced concern about the World Bank’s fitness to admin-
ister a clean technology fund.382 Environmental group Friends of the 
Earth (FOE) criticized the World Bank as devoting only 6% of its total 
funds to new renewable technologies (including small hydro but ex-
cluding conventional, larger hydro) in 2006.383 FOE is concerned that 
these funds will be used to fund more large, centralized fossil fueled-
fired power plants rather than “transform energy systems and . . . effec-
tively provide clean energy to the 1.6 billion people in the world who 
lack access to energy.”384 
 A 2008 critique by the Institute for Policy Studies (the “Institute’s 
2008 Report”) criticized the World Bank carbon finance efforts as 
                                                                                                                      
378 Anil Cabraal, Lead Energy Specialist, Energy & Water Dep’t, The World Bank, Pres-
entation at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Towards a Renewable 
Energy Future: A World Bank Plan for Action 6 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
379 See Daphne Wysham, Carbon Rush at World Bank, Asia Times (Hong Kong), Feb. 26, 
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GB26Dj03.html. 
380 See generally The Equator Principles, The “Equator Principles,” http://www.equator-
principles.com/principles.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing background on the 
equator principles, which are a financial industry benchmark for determining, assessing 
and managing social & environmental risk in project financing). 
381 Id. 
382 Obama Funds Bush Initiative for World Bank ‘Clean’ Energy Projects, Carbon Control 
News, May 11, 2009 (LEXIS). 
383 Oilchange Int’l & Friends of the Earth, The World Bank’s Climate Invest-
ment Funds: Still Fueling Global Warming 1 (2008), available at http:// 
www.foe.org/pdf/CIF_Factsheet.pdf. 
384 Id. 
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“dangerously counter-productive.”385 The Institute charged the World 
Bank with making business-as-usual look environmentally friendly.386 
The report alleged that by the end of 2007, less than 10% of the Bank’s 
carbon offset money went toward renewable energy projects of ten 
megawatts (MW) or less.387 Therefore, the critics’ concern is partly on 
wanting smaller projects funded, as well as including more renewable 
projects in the mix. 
 Some of this expenditure pattern reflects the very structure of the 
Kyoto cap-and-trade system. Kyoto does not fundamentally change 
capital expenditures on power generation, either in the thirty-five An-
nex I nations which are covered by carbon caps, nor in the other 165 
nations of the world that are not covered by Kyoto’s cap.388 There is no 
specific provision for the power generation sector.389 Kyoto does not 
specifically address the need to shift to greater reliance on non-fossil-
fuel sources of power generation.390 Rather, it attempts to set national 
carbon allowances for larger monitored sources in about thirty-five vol-
untarily participating developed countries and allows additional credits 
to be generated for, or sold to, these sources by offsetting carbon 
through various additional voluntary CDM projects in developing na-
tions.391 
 The Institute’s 2008 Report criticizes the CDM as resulting in 
enormous potential profits for investors in CDM projects, and resulting 
in little renewable energy investment.392 The report charges that the 
adopted CDM carbon trading mechanism was a variation on Brazil’s 
original proposal, as thereafter modified by the United States delega-
tion, where the United States eventually did not adopt the Kyoto Proto-
col.393 This power generation capital stock significantly determines the 
long-term concentrations of atmospheric carbon.394 
 The Institute’s 2008 Report also claims that the World Bank, acting 
pursuant to Kyoto, will use money supplied by donor countries in the 
                                                                                                                      
385 See Janet Redman, Sustainable Energy & Econ. Network, Inst. for Policy 
Studies, World Bank: Climate Profiteer 24–25 (2008). 
386 See id. at 7. 
387 Id. at 24–25. 
388 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 2 (describing objectives of the agreement). 
389 See id. 
390 See id. arts. 2 & 10 (referring to sustainable development but not specifically push-
ing for shift to renewable power generation). 
391 See id. art. 12. 
392 See Redman, supra note 385, at 14–15. 
393 Id.; see Parts I–II. 
394 Redman, supra note 385, at 3. 
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Northern Hemisphere to fund ecologically destructive industries in the 
Southern Hemisphere.395 This flow of cash is from developed nations 
to developing nations, either through Kyoto, World Bank, private, or 
other mechanisms. Ultimately, only thirty-five Kyoto Annex I countries, 
among 200 countries in the world, are affected by, or finance, CDM 
projects in developing countries.396 The report claims that this mecha-
nism has little transparency in funding carbon credits, while other in-
ternational funds actually finance carbon “debits” associated with $1.5 
billion in multilateral loans that the report identifies as for fossil-fuel-
fired “destructive” investments between 2005 and 2007.397 
 CDM projects to date have focused on increasing the number of 
CERs created for investors, rather than focusing on renewable energy 
projects and sustainable alternatives in developing countries.398 This 
creates an incentive for both host CDM countries and CDM investors to 
inflate the number of CERs created.399 Questions have been raised as to 
whether the Kyoto Executive Board and panels are able to correctly 
police the incentive to inflate CERs.400 Moreover, the impact of CDM 
projects has not been to promote appropriate renewable investments in 
developing countries, but rather has only served to create additional 
credits for Annex I countries.401 
 There is no mandatory environmental or sustainability assessment 
in Kyoto projects or public input, which was rejected as an infringe-
ment on host country sovereignty.402 The lack of massive renewable en-
ergy investments to date needed to shift the basis of power generation 
is documented.403 The bulk of the CDM carbon credits in developing 
countries is emanating not from renewable projects, but from reduc-
tion of certain high-carbon chemical gases in countries like China.404 
                                                                                                                      
395 See id. at 4. 
396 See UNFCCC, Parties & Observers, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ 
items/2704.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
397 Redman, supra note 385, at 3–4. The report cites the Tata Group 800 MW coal-fired 
project in Mundra, India, approved for $450 million in financing by the IFC, an affiliate of 
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398 Voigt, supra note 189, at 15. 
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400 Id. at 16. 
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402 Id. at 20. 
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 World Bank data shows that more than two-thirds of its carbon re-
duction achievements have involved HFC-23.405 However, when adding 
expenditures of the PCF and other multilateral financing mechanisms, 
critics still charge that only 10–15% of total investments have been in 
renewable energy, and international agency renewable energy invest-
ments are designed to achieve only about 5% of total GHG reductions, 
with a funding emphasis instead on nitrous oxide and HFC reduc-
tion406 from chemical plants in developing countries.407 
 The multilateral international agencies point to progress in ad-
dressing global warming. According to a 2007 report from the United 
Nations Environment Programme, investment capital flowing into re-
newable energy worldwide climbed from $80 billion in 2005 to $100 
billion in 2006.408 Of contrasting note, the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the part of the World Bank dealing 
directly with developing country governments, itself has principally 
funded direct renewable energy projects rather than HFC-23 or coal 
mine methane projects.409 
 There are over 1000 CDM projects,410 with twice that many in the 
project development pipeline.411 The existing projects have generated 
117 million issued CERs, with an estimated 2.6 billion CERs to be gen-
erated by 2012.412 This would represent almost 10% of monitored emis-
sions, which is a significant offset component relative to actual emis-
sions. Each CER generated in a developing country increases the GHG 
emissions allowed in the Annex I country by the eventual owner of the 
CERs.413 
 According to former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, “[t]he 
UNFCCC [the U.N. Kyoto Protocol mechanism] is charged with mak-
ing the global deal” on carbon reduction and it must occur “under its 
                                                                                                                      
405 Redman, supra note 385, at 22–23. 
406 Id. at 26 (regarding the HFC-23 factory investment). The CDM Governing Board 
has restricted future eligible investments in HFC-23 factories built before 2004, but has not 
restricted investments in newer plants. Id. at 27. 
407 Id. at 24–25. 
408 Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme, Investors Flock to Renew-
able Energy and Efficiency Technologies ( June 20, 2007), available at http://new.unep.org/ 
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409 Bretton Woods Project, The World Bank and Energy ( July 2, 2007), http://www. 
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authority.”414 World Bank CER acquisition activities have grown from 
the original PCF, created in 1999, to now ten additional carbon funds 
with a capitalization exceeding $2 billion.415 These can provide up-front 
financing for CDM carbon reduction projects, and importantly, can 
reduce or mitigate regulatory uncertainty and risk of eventual U.N. 
credit certification, credit delivery, and political risk.416 Since Kyoto, 
CDM CER offsets must be created in developing countries, and there is 
sovereign risk and commercial risk associated with these intangible 
items.417 This is mitigated by the fact that this is overseen by U.N. des-
ignated authorities in each nation that hosts a CDM project. 
3. Capital Flows and Necessary Power Infrastructure Changes 
 Much of this debate and criticism involves a difference in basic 
philosophy of how to control—and who should control—world capital 
flows. Ultimately, the reports criticize the Bank for wresting control of 
new investment mechanisms away from the countries where the CDM, 
or other investments will be made, and exercising certain controls with 
the financing.418 However, developing nations and their industries are 
not regulated by existing Kyoto carbon controls; developed nations and 
their businesses are. The critics’ reports charge that CDM projects fi-
nanced with World Bank money have been slow.419 The World Bank 
recently suggested forming a new expanded $5–10 billion clean tech-
nology fund, as well as a $500 million climate change adaptation 
fund.420 This would dramatically elevate the scope of the financing for 
carbon programs. The G8 nations in mid-2008 pledged to provide $10 
billion annually for a fund supporting clean energy technology de-
ployment in developing nations.421 
 Forest protection at the international level has also been subject to 
criticism. Much of the current debate on forest protection focuses on 
who controls the money: the developed country fund donors, interme-
diary international funding agencies, or the indigenous people who 
                                                                                                                      
414 Blair, supra note 14, at 5. 
415 Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Structuring and Financing Projects, in Climate 
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veloping countries). 
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reside in the areas where either forest is desired to be protected or car-
bon emissions capped.422 Some criticize the World Bank’s substantial 
efforts to fund forest preservation as benefiting private interests that 
preserve forests more than they preserve locally affected communi-
ties.423 There were protests in late 2007 by developing countries and 
their citizens against the establishment of the World Bank-funded For-
est Carbon Participation Project.424 So while this is about carbon, it is 
also about control over decisions about world resources and projects. 
 Between 1990 and 2000, world foreign direct investment in all sec-
tors of developing countries rose from $200 billion to $1.162 trillion.425 
The needs of countries outside the Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development will require an investment of some $2 trillion 
to install approximately 1900 gigawatts of new electric-generating ca-
pacity by 2025.426 
 Since 1997, when private investment in the power sector of devel-
oping countries peaked at $50 billion, private investment in power sec-
tors of developing countries has fallen dramatically. In 2002, private 
investment was only $7 billion.427 Similarly, over the last two decades, 
the World Bank Group’s financial commitments to developing country 
energy sectors have significantly declined. Between 1990 and 1994, 
World Bank Group energy sector financing accounted for approxi-
mately 25% of the Bank’s overall commitments. By 2001, however, the 
annual commitment percentage had fallen to less than 10% of overall 
financing.428 
 The decline in international financing is attributable to several 
factors. A majority of electric-sector investment during the early 1990s 
went to countries with favorable investment profiles (particularly Chi-
                                                                                                                      
422 John Vidal, U.N.’s Forest Protection Scheme at Risk from Organized Crime, Guardian (Man-
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na, Brazil, independent power programs in East Asia, and the privatiza-
tions of state-owned utilities in Latin America),429 where host govern-
ments had embraced market-based sector reform. However, some 
countries had difficulty sustaining the market reforms necessary for 
power sector commercial viability, making investors more cautious in 
financing transactions.430 Investors were particularly discouraged by 
numerous instances where host governments failed to honor power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) or carry out promised market reforms. 
For example, in Indonesia the government defaulted on sovereign 
guarantees on two projects, resulting in a loss of $575 million to the 
project sponsors.431 Ultimately, despite a ruling in its favor by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, the project 
sponsors recovered nothing from the Indonesian government.432 The 
sponsors ultimately recovered $290 million under its U.S. political risk 
insurance policy, which American taxpayers ultimately paid for.433 
 During the 1990s, the World Bank Group decided that the private 
sector was the solution for energy investments. It made a structural re-
adjustment of its lending policies, reducing the Bank’s lending support 
for public sector energy projects from approximately 25% to less than 
10%.434 Other development banks followed suit.435 
 The April 2008 Bangkok talks—following up the December 2007 
Bali round of talks—concluded that a post-2012 international carbon 
scheme should look much like the pre-2012 Kyoto regime, including 
trading of allowances and the creation of additional credits or offsets 
through the JI and CDM mechanisms.436 This is not as much a state-
ment of success of such programs to date, as a statement of hoped-for 
continuation of existing international carbon reduction methods.437 
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The 2009 Copenhagen Conference showed more dissent than consen-
sus on any future controls.438 Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol does not show 
significant signs of being a technical success within the necessary time 
frames given the immense tasks at hand.439 
 Effective adaptation of forests, agriculture, and water resources will 
require the broad planning and regulatory capacity of a range of minis-
tries in developing countries.440 Enhancements of these capabilities will 
require aid for viable international frameworks.441 Public finance is 
necessary to build human and institutional capacity in developing 
countries for carbon mitigation and adaptation.442 
 The key is formulating and implementing a workable and very 
prompt policy response in developing nations. Richard Bradley, divi-
sion head at the International Energy Agency, Paris, at the Bali Kyoto 
conference concluded that “[f]ossil fuel will dominate the energy sup-
ply for the foreseeable future. Investors need an international cost-
effective framework if energy climate change objectives are to be 
met.”443 “It is not yet possible to discern a human influence on the 
emissions pathway. Policy effort is insufficient.”444 Public finance and a 
workable renewable program template are necessary to build human 
and institutional capacity in developing countries for carbon mitigation 
and adaptation.445 Fortunately, there is such a template—although not 
widely advertised—of how to accomplish a shift to renewable resources 
in developing countries.446 
V. A Template for International Success: What Works in 
Developing Nations in Renewable Energy 
 Fortunately, there is an alternative course towards a win-win situa-
tion regarding global warming and renewable energy in developing 
nations. There is evidence of success in developing nations deploying 
renewable power.447 Between 1993 and 2005, five nations in Asia were 
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among the first to develop small power producer (SPP) programs to 
promote renewable energy development in their countries.448 These 
programs create important models and lessons for the rest of the 
world.449 
 They have achieved in just a few years a substantial contribution 
from new renewable small power projects to their growing national 
energy supplies: almost 4%of power supply in Sri Lanka, India and 
Thailand are from SPP renewable energy initiatives.450 These suc-
cesses in Asia are the key to what can happen in developing countries. 
Approximately 60% of all new power generation capacity financed in 
developing countries is in Asia.451 Therefore, how and what energy 
resources are deployed in Asia has long-term implications for global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and environmental integrity. These 
five Asian nations each have different governmental forms, and have 
different predominant fuel sources in their power generation bases 
such as hydro, coal, gas, and oil. While some of the national electric 
systems have an integrated high-voltage transmission system and oth-
ers have a disintegrated or island system, there are key similarities: 
• All are in need of long-term increases in power generation capac-
ity (although Thailand has had a short-term surplus) 
• All have the potential to utilize small-scale renewable energy op-
tions 
• Each system employs either deliberately or de facto a standardized 
power purchase agreement (PPA), to put the investment deal to-
gether, although it is not necessarily a neutral or consensual docu-
ment in all cases.452 
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 Beyond these common elements, each system has important dis-
tinctions.453 Each of these programs is built on prior successful experi-
ences in the United States under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act requirements and/or other Asian countries that preceded the Act’s 
effort.454 Table 3 displays key comparative elements of program design 
and implementation in five of the Asian programs surveyed.455 Of the 
columns in Table 3, the middle column is note worthy. It shows that two 
of the profiled programs subsidize renewable energy SPPs.456 “Thailand 
does so by providing a project-specific subsidy through a competitive 
solicitation process. Andhra Pradesh, a state in India, does so by provid-
ing a tariff in excess of true avoided cost for renewable energy SPPs 
power sales.”457 
 
Table 3: Comparative Program Overview 
Country Program Year  
begun 
Maximum 
size (MW) 
Premium for 
renewable 
energy 
Primary fuel Eligible PPA 
solicitation 
Thailand 1992 <60 or <90 Yes, competitive 
bid 
Gas Controlled 
period 
Indonesia 1993 <30 Java 
<15 other 
island grids 
No Renewable 
Energy 
Controlled 
period 
Sri Lanka 1998 <10 No Hydro Open offer 
India: Andhra 
Pradesh 
1995 <20 
Prior <50 
Yes, in tariff Wind Open offer 
India: Tamil Nadu 1995 < 50 No Wind Open offer 
Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The Algorithm of Carbon and International Development, 19 Stan. L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 510, 527 (2008). 
 
 Table 4 displays salient comparative elements of PPA design and 
contractual entitlement in the renewable energy programs in these five 
Asian countries.458 
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Table 4: Comparative PPA Elements 
Country program Standard 
PPA? 
Maximum 
years 
Third-party 
sales 
Self-service 
wheeling 
Net meter–
banking 
Thailand Yes 20–25 firm
5 nonfirm 
No, under 
consideration
No, under 
consideration
Yes, if <1 
MW 
Indonesia Yes 20 firm 
5 nonfirm 
No Yes No 
Sri Lanka Yes 15 No No No 
India: Andhra 
Pradesh 
Not formally, 
but a de facto 
standardized 
form 
20 No, previously 
allowed 
Yes, but very 
expensive 
Yes 
India: Tamil Nadu In 
development
5–15 No, previously 
allowed 
Yes Yes 
Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The Algorithm of Carbon and International Development, 19 Stan. L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 510, 528 (2008). 
 
 Several important lessons for small renewable program design and 
policy in developing nations are revealed by analyzing these programs 
in detail:459 
• “A framework for structured SPP project development is necessary. 
SPPs do not spring fully born[e] from the existing electric sector-
environments” in developing countries.460 “A system of law, regula-
tion, and utility interface” that facilitates orderly SPP development 
must exist.461 
• “A transparent process is required to build investor, developer, and 
lender confidence.”462 This is particularly true if those investors 
are expected to be private parties and conventionally financed. 
• “The single utility buyer of power in most of the electric sectors” of 
developing nations can more robustly and efficiently promote re-
newable SPPs, either by (a) “a program for purchase of all SPP 
power at its full value (avoided cost) to the wholesale system,” 
and/or (b) “the introduction of some combination of third-party 
retail sales, net metering energy banking, or third-party wheel-
ing.”463 
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• “In many systems, additional subsidies, . . . reflect[ing the] fuel di-
versity and environmental advantages, are used to assist higher-cost 
renewable energy and smaller SPP projects.”464 
• “Bidding can be strategically employed to minimize the ultimate 
system cost to the buyer” of power generated from renewable 
power resource development.465 
 These results in Asian countries demonstrate how renewable 
power development can be successful in developing countries. Many of 
the programs were implemented prior to Kyoto impacts and are sepa-
rate from the CDM Kyoto program. Adding CDM to these programs 
would provide even greater incentives. So there is a model for success-
fully beginning the shift to a renewable power base in fast-electrifying 
developing nations.466 
Conclusion: Final Thoughts on International Carbon 
 If the world misses or ignores these renewable energy opportuni-
ties in developing nations, it misses the opportunity to successfully cur-
tail global warming. The combustion of fossil fuels generates 98% of 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and CO2 comprises 
83% of greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions in the United States.467 Be-
tween 1990 and 2008, 41% of CO2 emissions are attributable to the 
electric power sector.468 The sheer amount of CO2 emitted into the en-
vironment is enormous, and once it is released into the atmosphere, 
CO2 remains there for 100 years.469 Global CO2 emissions are rising at 
the rate of approximately 10% per year.470 
 Only the shift of the power generation base to a substantial non-
carbon component can offer the potential to successfully deal with 
world GHG emissions. Developing nations will soon dominate GHG 
emissions and retain this position into the indefinite future. Given this, 
the proposed shift in the power generation base must succeed in devel-
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oping nations for the world to have an opportunity to substantially cur-
tail GHGs worldwide. 
 While a successful model exists from programs apart from interna-
tional legal mechanisms and programs—funded largely by the World 
Bank in developing nations in Asia and elsewhere—that aim to mitigate 
global warming, there needs to be a sustained push to implement these 
successful models more broadly in developing nations. International 
agencies, which finance or guarantee much of the financing of power 
projects in developing nations, have a critical role to play in the success 
of such efforts. However, the Kyoto Protocol, since enacted as an inter-
national legal protocol in 1997, does not speak a language amenable to 
developing nations.471 It does not include developing nations in its cov-
erage; it does not require any shift in power generation bases either in 
regulated developed countries or developing countries; and it does not 
deal with black carbon, the significant warming chemical emitted pro-
fusely in developing nations. 
 The current scientific consensus forebodes that changes in the in-
ternational legal scheme must be implemented by 2015 or it may be 
too late.472 Waiting until after 2012, as international regulatory mecha-
nisms are, to make any changes in the current Kyoto legal scheme 
could be too little, too late. Middlebury College’s William McKibben 
has illustrated, with reference to James Hansen—one of the world’s 
leading climate scientists, that we either implement a lasting solution 
within the next five to ten years, or the battle may be lost forever.473 
Three years ago Hansen stated that ‘‘[w]e have at most ten years—not 
ten years to decide upon action, but ten years to alter fundamentally 
the trajectory of global greenhouse emissions.’’474 This fundamental 
change is nowhere on the horizon of international mechanisms as they 
are now embodied in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 Power generation projects take years to develop and implement. 
Changes in international law effective after 2012 would not be imple-
mented or serviceable on a widespread basis by 2015, given how little 
movement in the renewable generation base there has been since the 
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carbon reduction process was started in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol 
enacted in 1997.475 In fact, global carbon emissions have continued to 
climb every year at an increasing rate of gain.476 A more urgent inter-
national implementation schedule is required; however, that schedule 
will only follow after legal creation of a concerted international agency 
role designed to curtail current trends in increasing carbon emissions 
and to provide technical assistance to more than 100 developing coun-
tries.477 So the next two years are the period in which the world will cast 
its carbon future, and where goes carbon, goes global warming. As the 
poet Robert Frost wrote, “Some say the world will end in fire; some say 
in ice.”478 Either, he notes, “would suffice.”479 
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